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WILL FULL BENEFITS PARITY CREATE REAL PARITY? – CONGRESS’S 
SECOND ATTEMPT AT ENDING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MENTAL 
ILLNESS: THE PAUL WELLSTONE AND PETE DOMENICI MENTAL HEALTH 
AND ADDICTION EQUITY ACT OF 2008 
INTRODUCTION 
On February 5, 1963, President John F. Kennedy sent to Congress a 
series of proposals on mental illness.1  At the top of the President’s list of 
actions requested of every level of government, as well as private citizens, 
was a call “to bestow the full benefits of our society on those who suffer 
from mental disabilities.”2  More than forty-five years after President 
Kennedy sent this call to action to the members of the 88th Congress, on 
October 3, 2008, the 110th Congress passed the Paul Wellstone and Pete 
Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 
(MHPAEA).3  The new law was signed twelve years after Congress’s first 
attempt at parity in the coverage of mental illness, the highly touted but 
largely unsuccessful Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 (MHPA).4  
Full parity, as the term is generally understood, refers to “the equalizing 
of all treatment and dollar limits between medical and mental health care as 
well as the same co-payments and coinsurance rates.”5  This definition 
makes the term less meaningful than it should be, however.  When 
politicians and scholars use the term “full parity,” they are only referring to 
the benefits offered, rather than to the offering of benefits.  That is, for an 
 
 1. The American Presidency Project, John F. Kennedy: Special Message to the Congress 
on Mental Illness and Mental Retardation, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php? 
pid=9546 (last visited Sept. 7, 2009) (describing “mental illness and mental retardation” as 
“among [the nation’s] most critical health problems,” and outlining the following government 
objectives: (1) to determine the causes of mental illness and eliminate them; (2) to strengthen 
resources of knowledge and skilled manpower to sustain the attack against these illnesses; 
and (3) to strengthen and improve programs and facilities serving the individuals suffering 
these diseases). 
 2. Id. (emphasis added). 
 3. See Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act 
of 2008 (“MHPAEA”), Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3881 (2008) (codified as amended 26 
U.S.C. § 9812, 29 U.S.C. § 1185a, & 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5). 
 4. See Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 (“MHPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 
2944 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5). 
 5. Carolyn M. Levinson & Benjamin G. Druss, The Evolution of Mental Health Parity in 
American Politics, 28 ADMIN. & POL’Y MENTAL HEALTH 139, 143 (2000). 
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insurance policy to offer full parity in its healthcare benefits, it merely must 
place the same restrictions and requirements on all benefits offered, 
regardless of the nature of the illness or the treatment required for such 
illness.  However, if the insurance policy fails to cover a certain type of 
illness or treatment regimen entirely, this does not create a lack of parity. 
The MHPA failed to create any form of meaningful parity because it 
implicitly allowed group health plans to discriminate against mental 
illnesses, and it completely failed to address substance use disorders.6  By 
enacting the MHPAEA, Congress rejected many of the flaws of the MHPA.  
Specifically, the MHPAEA prohibits group health plans that offer benefits for 
mental health and substance use disorder from placing any financial 
requirements on such benefits that are not placed on other healthcare 
benefits.7  Furthermore, the new law prohibits insurance providers that offer 
these benefits from creating any greater treatment limitations than those 
required for other healthcare benefits.8  However, the MHPAEA still fails to 
require any insurance plan to cover mental illnesses or substance use 
disorders.9  Moreover, the law allows certain exemptions created by the 
MHPA to continue.10  After enactment of the MHPA, almost every health 
insurance provider covered by the plan actively used its loopholes to 
continue discriminating against the mentally ill.11 
While the MHPAEA only recently went into effect, and thus it is too soon 
to predict the effect the law will have on the disparate treatment of the 
mentally ill, two things are clear.  First, the law is a substantial improvement 
on the MHPA.  Second, loopholes remain, and past evidence shows that 
providers may exploit them, even if it means continued discrimination.  This 
article explores the history of mental health discrimination and legislative 
attempts for parity on both state and federal levels.  It focuses on a 
comparison of the MHPAEA with the MHPA.  While it appears clear that the 
Congress has created a new law vastly superior to its prior version both in 
scope and in likely effect, it is clear also that the new law fails to reach far 
enough and will allow for continued discrimination against those suffering 
mental illness. 
Section I of this article discusses the history of discrimination against 
individuals suffering mental illness, and how that discrimination led to 
 
 6. See discussion infra Section II.A. (discussing the goals and failures of the MHPA). 
 7. See MHPAEA, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §§ 512(a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(1), 122 Stat. 3881, 
3881-88; see also discussion infra Section IV.A. (comparing the MHPAEA with the MHPA). 
 8. See MHPAEA §§ 512(a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(1); see also discussion infra Section IV.A. 
(comparing the MHPAEA with the MHPA). 
 9. See discussion infra Section IV.B (discussing whether the MHPAEA can meet its goals). 
 10. See id. 
 11. See discussion infra Section II.A. (discussing how health plans continued to provide 
unequal coverage of mental health conditions after the MHPA). 
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enactment of the MHPA. This section also addresses how insurance 
providers have continued to discriminate against the mentally ill and how 
the general perception of mental illness as a disease of the mind has 
perpetuated bias.  This perception and continued discrimination has created 
the need for more substantial parity legislation, and has led to the MHPAEA. 
Section II reviews the steps taken to enact the MHPA as well as the goals 
and failures of the law.  This section also discusses briefly the several 
attempts at enacting more meaningful legislation between the passage of 
the MHPA and the MHPAEA.  The Section concludes by covering both sides 
of the main parity debate: the cost of parity. 
Section III analyzes various attempts taken by state legislatures to 
achieve parity.  The first part of this section reviews the five state laws 
enacted prior to the MHPA and how these statutes were more 
comprehensive than the original federal statute.  The second part discusses 
the explosion of federal legislation following passage of the MHPA, what 
these laws sought to achieve after seeing the federal law, and why the laws 
were unable to reach their goals. 
Section IV discusses the MHPAEA and the federal legislature’s attempt to 
create full parity. It begins by showing how the law differs from the MHPA.  
This section explains why the MHPAEA represents a substantial improvement 
on the original law by creating full parity in benefits and how it potentially 
will provide better coverage for millions of Americans.  The final part of this 
section highlights what the MHPAEA missed, including its failure to eliminate 
all of the loopholes created by the original law and, consequently, its failure 
to create true parity.  It also compares the MHPAEA with the federal law that 
comes closest to true parity, the Federal Employees Health Benefits 
Program. 
I.  STIGMA – THE HISTORICAL DISCRIMINATION AND SEGREGATION OF MENTAL 
ILLNESS 
The continued difficulty in achieving true parity for individuals suffering 
from mental illness, and a reason it took the United States Congress until 
2008 to pass meaningful mental health parity legislation, most likely stems 
from a persistent belief that mental and physical health are unrelated.12  This 
belief is also one cause of the stigmatization surrounding mental health 
care.13  The notion of a distinction between mental and physical well-being 
can be traced to 17th century philosopher Rene Descartes’ theories of the 
 
 12. See Patrick J. Kennedy, Why We Must End Insurance Discrimination Against Mental 
Health Care, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 363, 364 (2004). 
 13. Id. 
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separation of mind and body.14  Descartes conceptualized the “mind” as 
connected to the “spirit” and, thus, a concern of organized religion.15  The 
“body,” on the other hand, was considered to be the concern of medical 
physicians, wholly separate from the mind.16  As generations acknowledged 
and elaborated on Descartes’ views, the treatment of the mind came to be 
considered “non-scientific” and “non-medical,” and illnesses of the mind 
became regarded as failures of the individuals who suffered them, rather 
than treatable conditions.17 
The stigma of mental illness did not begin in the 17th century, however.  
Early cultures interpreted the abnormal signs of mental illness as 
materializations of demonic possession or some different otherworldly 
cause.18  Whatever caused mental illness and abnormality, early societies 
certainly did not consider issues of the mind to be issues of the body.19  
While this belief has been generally upheld and propagated throughout 
most of history, and in fact is still a point of contention today, there have 
been those who were willing to argue against conviction, with mixed 
results.20 
In the United States, the colonial era urged a familial responsibility 
toward mental illness.21  Likely due to a lack of government run institutions 
of any sort, the mentally ill population was considered a problem largely 
consigned to families.22  Urbanization forced the government to confront the 
issue, and the several states began building institutions, first dubbed asylums 
 
 14. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON 
GENERAL—EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 (1999) [hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL REPORT]; see also 2 
The Philosophical Works of Descartes 99-100 (Elizabeth S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross trans., 
1934) (stating that the “mind can be perceived clearly and distinctly . . . [as] a complete thing 
without any of those forms or attributes by which we recognize that body is a substance . . . 
and body is understood distinctly and as a complete thing apart from the attributes attaching 
to the mind”). 
 15. SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 5. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Kennedy, supra note 12, at 364. 
 18. For example in ancient Egypt, early Greek and Roman civilizations, and Europe 
during the Middle Ages people believed that mental disabilities were a sign that the person 
was afflicted by demons.  Samuel Jan Brakel, Historical Trends, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND 
THE LAW 9, 9-10 (1985). 
 19. See id. (describing several culture’s views of mental health, which focused on 
supernatural causes and solutions). 
 20. See WALTER J. COVILLE ET AL., ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 16-17 (1960) (discussing 
opinions of various scientists throughout the 15th, 16th, and 17th centuries who believed that 
mental illness was not a matter of demonic possession or witchcraft; still many still believed 
that there was some outside phenomenon—such as planetary control—that actually led to 
mental illness). 
 21. SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 75. 
 22. Id. 
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and later known as mental hospitals.23  During this period, if individuals 
suffering mental illness were not cared for at home or in a mental hospital, 
they would likely be found in jails or other penal institutions.24  New 
treatments began to emerge during this time period;25 however, treatments 
generally proved largely unsuccessful.26 
During the 19th and 20th centuries, four separate models were used in 
an attempt to correct chronic mental illness in members of the general 
population: the “moral treatment” model, the “mental hygiene” model, the 
“community mental health” model, and the “community support” model.27  
“Moral treatment,” the first attempt at a broad sociologically based 
treatment for mental illness, lasted from approximately 1800-1850.28  The 
two-pronged treatment goal of “moral treatment” failed, and states regularly 
built local asylums for chronically ill individuals – funded, however, by local 
governments.29  From the late 19th century through World War I, the 
“mental hygiene” period replaced “moral treatment.”30  However, the issues 
of overcrowding and underfunding created atrocious conditions in many 
mental institutions.31  The mentally ill – and some suffering illnesses as 
straightforward as dementia – found themselves mired in a stigmatic game 
of hot potato, being passed from local to state asylums as local 
governments found they were unable (or unwilling) to properly care for 
them.32 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id.  The Surgeon General Report traces the origin of mental healthcare to the 
Pennsylvania Hospital, a Philadelphia institution opened in the mid-1700s that had provisions 
for individuals suffering from mental illness in the basement.  Id.  Also in the mid-1700s, 
Virginia became the first state to build an asylum for its citizens, and the Williamsburg asylum 
became the birthplace of specialty mental healthcare.  Id. 
 26. SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 78 (“At best, the hospitals provided 
humane custodial care; at worst, they neglected or abused the patients.”). 
 27. See id. at 79 tbl. 2-10 (“Moral treatment” lasted from approximately 1800-1850, 
generally took place in an asylum, and focused on humane, restorative treatment.  “Mental 
hygiene” lasted from about 1890-1920, generally took place in a mental hospital or clinic, 
and focused on prevention of mental illness and a scientific orientation.  “Community mental 
health” began in 1955 and lasted for about 15 years, generally took place in a community 
mental health center, and the focus of the reform was on social integration through 
deinstitutionalization.  The “community support” movement has lasted from 1975 through 
today, generally takes place in the community at large, and the reform focuses on mental 
illness as a social welfare issue.). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 78. 
 30. Id. at 79 tbl. 2-10. 
 31. SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 78. 
 32. States were responsible for building public asylums during the 19th and early 20th 
centuries; however, local governments were required to fund individual cases of care.  Id.  
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These conditions eventually led to federal legislation, beginning in the 
1950s and continuing through the 1970s, aimed at removing most mentally 
ill individuals from state-run mental hospitals.33  World War II ushered in an 
era of “community mental health centers” that focused on 
deinstitutionalization and social integration.34  The end of the Vietnam War 
brought about the present-day era of “community support” that focuses on 
mental illness as a social welfare issue.35  However, community support 
services are costly and thus widely unavailable to many suffering from 
mental illness.36  Furthermore, many of the services necessary to properly 
run this system have been poorly coordinated and have therefore not 
benefited those they were designed to assist.37  While the government’s 
attempt to correct past wrongs by deinstitutionalizing the mentally ill and 
integrating them into society was a necessary step in the right direction, the 
haphazard manner by which deinstitutionalization was achieved has given 
way to an inferior mental healthcare system, incapable of properly treating 
the mentally ill. 
Historically, society has spurned individuals suffering mental illnesses out 
of contempt, fear, cruelty, ignorance, and misunderstanding, forcing the 
individuals to suffer in silence.38  Their families have also been forced to 
suffer as their loved ones have been pushed to the “margins of society,” or 
sometimes worse.39  As late as 1972, States continued to institutionalize 
mentally ill citizens and forcibly sterilize them without consent or knowledge 
of the procedure.40  A study in the late 1960s showed that the public tended 
 
Due to inability to properly fund asylums, local governments began to transfer the mentally ill 
to jails and poorhouses.  Id.  After the public learned of the deplorable conditions at many 
asylums, state governments passed State Care Acts, which made state governments 
responsible for the care of their mentally ill population.  Id.  The local governments grabbed 
this opportunity by the horns and sent every mentally ill asylum resident to the state 
counterpart facility.  Id. 
 33. For example, Congress passed the Mental Retardation Facilities and Community 
Mental Health Centers Construction Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282 
(appropriating funds for projects aimed at constructing centers for research and assistance of 
the mentally disabled). 
 34. SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 78-79. 
 35. Id. at 79-80. 
 36. For example, 16% of the United States population does not have health insurance, 
many people who have health insurance are underinsured for mental disorders, 
discrimination, a stigma surrounding mental illnesses, and access barriers to members of 
many racial and ethnic groups.  Id.  All of these reasons prevent people who have mental 
illnesses from seeking help.  Id. 
 37. Id. at 101. 
 38. 141 Cong. Rec. S3001 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1995) (statement of Sen. Domenici). 
 39. 141 CONG. REC. S3001-02 (1995). 
 40. 141 CONG. REC. S3001 (1995). 
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generally to be repelled by individuals suffering from mental illness, partly 
because of a public perception that these individuals are dangerous.41 
These views have not been eradicated in the past thirty to forty years.  
The ignorance of the biological nature of many mental illnesses continues to 
have detrimental effects.  According to a 1997 survey released by the 
National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, one in three people with a severe 
mental illness had been passed over for a job because of their psychiatric 
label.42  The outdated and medically inaccurate distinction between mental 
and physical healthcare continues to advance the stigma of mental illness.43  
The issue of employers turning down potential new hires because of mental 
illness is far from the only remaining stigma. 
In 1996, four years after a mental health parity bill was first introduced 
on Capitol Hill, the federal government passed the first form of mental 
health parity legislation applicable on a national level: the MHPA.44  This 
Act forced certain health insurance providers to partially cease 
discrimination against the mentally ill by requiring these plans to create 
parity in terms of annual and lifetime caps on benefits.45  The response to 
the new law, discussed in detail in the following section, proved that 
discrimination against mental illness was alive and well.  While the MHPA 
banned different annual and lifetime limits between mental health benefits 
and what the law deemed medical or surgical benefits,46 it left the door 
open to essentially all other forms of disparate coverage.  The result was 
that, while most insurance providers had come into compliance with the 
federal law, eighty-seven percent of these providers now burdened the 
mentally ill with higher cost-sharing and limitations on access.47 
 
 41. HOWARD B. KAPLAN, THE SOCIOLOGY OF MENTAL ILLNESS 84 (1972) (citing Jack Elinson 
et al., Public Image of Mental Health Services (1967)). 
 42. Otto F. Wahl, Mental Health Consumers’ Experience of Stigma, 25 Schizophrenia 
Bull. 467, 471 (1999). 
 43. See SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 7 (discussing recent surveys of 
public attitudes, finding that while the public has a better understanding of mental illness, 
people continue to associate mental illness with violent behavior). 
 44. MHPA, Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2944 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a; 42 
U.S.C. § 300gg-5). 
 45. See MHPA § 1185a; see also discussion infra Section II.A (discussing the goals, 
effects, and shortcomings of the MHPA of 1996). 
 46. See MHPA § 1185a. 
 47. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MENTAL HEALTH PARITY ACT: DESPITE NEW FEDERAL 
STANDARDS, MENTAL HEALTH BENEFITS REMAIN LIMITED 5 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 GAO REPORT]. 
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II.  MENTAL HEALTH PARITY 
A. The Path to Parity – Goals, Effects, and Failures of the Mental Health 
Parity Act of 1996 
In an effort to prohibit employers and insurers from discriminating 
against individuals with respect to access to health care coverage for mental 
illnesses, Congress enacted the MHPA.48  The law, which became effective 
on January 1, 1998, barred employers and insurers from placing lower 
lifetime or annual dollar limits on mental health benefits than for medical or 
surgical benefits.49  The lifetime and annual dollar limits were the only 
equalities for mental health coverage guaranteed by the MHPA.50  Based on 
the lack of additional protections, employers and insurers were permitted 
implicitly, if not explicitly, to continue restricting coverage of mental illnesses 
in other financial respects.  The narrow scope of the MHPA ensured that 
although the removal of discriminatory barriers to access for the mentally ill 
was the stated purpose of the law, its actual effects would prove to be 
mainly symbolic in nature.51 
The MHPA, which amended the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA),52 the Public Health Services Act (PHSA),53 and the Internal 
Revenue Code, was enacted in response to a seemingly concerted effort on 
the part of insurance providers to lower overall costs by restricting and 
limiting benefits for mental illnesses in ways not applicable to physical health 
coverage.54  Prior to the MHPA’s enactment, only about 55 percent of 
employers in states without comprehensive parity laws reported that they 
 
 48. MHPA, Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2944 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a; 42 
U.S.C. § 300gg-5); see also C. Geoffrey Weirich & Ashoo K. Sharma, Tracking the Path to 
Parity Between Mental and Physical Health Benefits, 17 LAB. LAW. 469, 470-74 (2002) 
(discussing the background, requirements, exemptions, and effect of the MHPA). 
 49. MHPA § 1185a; see also Weirich & Sharma, supra note 48, at 471. 
 50. See Weirich & Sharma, supra note 48, at 471 (discussing the MHPA’s requirements); 
see also id. at 473 (“[A]n employer’s group health plan could continue to impose greater 
restrictions on the number of covered outpatient office visits or hospital days for mental health 
treatment than on the number of other health treatments and could require a higher co-pay 
for such treatment without running afoul of MHPA requirements.”). 
 51. Daniel P. Gitterman et al., Toward Full Mental Health Parity and Beyond, HEALTH AFF., 
July-Aug. 2001, at 68, 68 [hereinafter Gitterman et al., Full Mental Health Parity]. 
 52. MHPA § 702 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a). 
 53. MHPA § 703 (codified at 42 U.S.C §300gg-5). 
 54. Paul S. Appelbaum, Litigating Insurance Coverage for Mental Disorders, 40 HOSP. & 
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 993, 993 (1989); Brian D. Shannon, The Brain Gets Sick, Too—The 
Case for Equal Insurance Coverage for Serious Mental Illness, 24 ST. MARY’S L.J. 365, 370-75 
(1993) (also discussing the reasons for the discrimination).  In 1997, Congress also 
implemented the MHPA by amending the Internal Revenue Code.  Taxpayer Relief Act of 
1997, Pub. L. 105-34, §§ 1531-32, 111 Stat. 788, 1080-85 (1997). 
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offered parity in dollar limits between mental health and medical/surgical 
benefits.55  The MHPA addressed this issue by requiring group health plans, 
or coverage provided by an insurer in connection with a group health plan, 
to “have equal annual and lifetime dollar limits for mental and medical 
health care benefits.”56  This parity could be created through one of three 
methods: 1) an insurer could provide no limits for mental health benefits; 2) 
an insurer could provide the same limits for both mental and medical health 
benefits; or 3) an insurer could provide a single limit for both mental and 
medical health benefits.57 
With regard to annual and lifetime benefits parity, there is little argument 
that the law had its intended effect.  According to a 2000 Government 
Accounting Office (GAO) report, 87% of employer insurance plans were in 
compliance with the MHPA.58  However, of the employers’ plans that were 
in compliance with the law, 87% contained at least one plan feature that 
was more restrictive for mental health benefits than for physical health 
benefits.59  Moreover, the GAO report found that employers who 
implemented parity in dollar limits after enactment of the MHPA were much 
more likely to have changed another aspect of coverage to be more 
restrictive on mental health care than were employers who were in 
compliance prior to the MHPA or who failed to come into compliance.60  
Thus, it seems clear that while the MHPA was enacted to create some level 
of parity between mental and physical health care coverage, insurers who 
lacked at least an equivalent level of parity prior to enactment took every 
measure to ensure that coverage remained equally disparate after 
enactment.61 
Clearly the MHPA did not fully address the issues that are responsible for 
dissimilar coverage.  However, the symbolic effect of the law was to create a 
stepping-stone toward future parity legislation that would perhaps more fully 
 
 55. 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 47, at 11. 
 56. Michele Garvin et al., Mental Health Parity: The Massachusetts Experience in Context, 
BOSTON BAR J., May-June 2003, at 18, 18. 
 57. Id. 
 58. 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 47, at 11. 
 59. Id. at 12. 
 60. See id. at 13-14 (Roughly 65% of employers that implemented parity through dollar 
limits revised one or more aspects of mental health coverage to be more restrictive, while 
roughly 26% of employers that did not make changes to dollar limits have revised one or 
more aspects of mental health coverage to be more restrictive.). 
 61. Insurers created continued disparate coverage by changing certain benefit design 
features to be more restrictive on mental health care coverage than physical health care 
coverage.  These benefit design changes included:  fewer office visits covered; fewer hospital 
days covered; increased outpatient office visit copayments; increased outpatient office visit 
coinsurance; increased hospital stay coinsurance; increased hospital stay copayments; and 
increased caps on enrollee’s out-of-pocket costs.  Id. at 14 tbl. 5. 
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benefit those suffering from mental illness.  The “strong and unlikely 
congressional team” of Republican Senator Pete Domenici of New Mexico 
and Democratic Senator Paul Wellstone of Minnesota authored the 
MHPA.62  Both men drew on personal experiences with family members 
suffering from mental illness to forge a partnership in support of parity 
legislation.63  The MHPA was not their first attempt at enacting parity 
legislation, however.  The Senators, along with Representative Marge 
Roukema, began pursuing federal parity legislation in 1992.64  The first 
serious attempt at full parity came in 1996 when Congress considered the 
Equitable Care for Severe Mental Illness Act of 1995 (ECSMIA),65 which 
would have mandated coverage and provided something close to full parity 
for severe mental illnesses.66 
The ECSMIA failed to make it out of conference committee.67 However, 
Senators Domenici and Wellstone, the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill 
(NAMI),68 and the Coalition for Fairness in Mental Illness Coverage 
 
 62. Levinson & Druss, supra note 5, at 139. 
 63. Id.  Senator Domenici’s daughter was receiving treatment at the time for chronic 
schizophrenia, and Senator Wellstone’s brother was battling drug addiction and bipolar 
disorder.  Id. 
 64. See Equitable Health Care for Severe Mental Illnesses Act of 1992, S. 2696, 102d 
Cong. (1992); see also S. REP. NO. 107-61, at 2 (2001); John V. Jacobi, Parity and 
Difference: The Value of Parity Legislation for the Seriously Mentally Ill, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 
185, 192 (2003); Keith Nelson, Legislative and Judicial Solutions for Mental Health Parity: S. 
543, Reasonable Accommodation, and an Individualized Remedy Under Title I of the ADA, 51 
AM. U. L. REV. 91, 102-03 (2001). 
 65. S. 298, 104th Cong. § 1 (1995). 
 66. Jacobi, supra note 64, at 192.  The EHCSMIA defined “severe mental illness” as “an 
illness that is defined through diagnosis, disability and duration, and includes disorders with 
psychotic symptoms such as schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, manic depressive 
disorder, autism, as well as severe forms of other disorders such as major depression, panic 
disorder, and obsessive compulsive disorder.”  S. 298 § 6.  Notably, the EHCSMIA would 
have mandated coverage of these illnesses.  Specifically, the bill required that “health care 
coverage, whether provided through public or private health insurance or any other means of 
financing, must provide for the treatment of severe mental illnesses in a manner that is 
equitable and commensurate with that provided for other major physical illnesses.”  S. 298 § 
3(a)(2).  A main drawback of the MHPA was that it failed to mandate any coverage of mental 
illness.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(b)(1) (2006) (omitting a mandate directed toward any 
coverage of mental illness by stating “[n]othing in this section shall be construed . . . as 
requiring a group health plan (or health insurance coverage offered in connection with such a 
plan) to provide any mental health benefits . . . .). 
 67. S. REP. NO. 107-61, at 2; see also Jacobi, supra note 64, at 192. 
 68. NAMI is a grassroots organization founded in 1979 for the purpose of assisting 
people with mental illnesses and their families; they have affiliates in more than 1,100 
communities in the United States.  See Nat’l Alliance on Mental Illness, About NAMI: Support, 
Education, Advocacy, and Research, www.nami.org/template.cfm?section=About_NAMI (last 
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(CFMIC)69 continued to coordinate support for parity legislation.70  The next 
step toward mental health parity came in April 1996 when Senators 
Domenici and Wellstone introduced Amendment 3681 to the Kennedy-
Kassebaum health insurance portability measure that would eventually 
become PL 104-191.71  Facing opposition from business interest lobbyists 
and conservative legislators, who were focused on the financial impact 
parity would have on small businesses and working people and only willing 
to accept a significantly diminished version of parity, Amendment 3681 
initially passed in the Senate but was eventually eliminated, along with every 
other amendment from the Kennedy-Kassebaum bill.72 
Following the failure of mental health parity as an amendment to the 
Kennedy-Kassebaum bill, Domenici and Wellstone continued their 
aggressive push to enact parity legislation.  In August 1996, the Senators 
introduced a compromised version of their previous mental health parity bill 
as the MHPA, a freestanding piece of legislation.73  The bill failed to make it 
out of the Labor and Human Resources Committee of the Senate.74  The 
Senators next attached their proposed parity legislation to a VA/HUD 
Appropriations bill.75  Senator Kennedy, who failed to support parity during 
the debate over his cosponsored insurance portability legislation, showed 
full support for mental health parity as part of the VA/HUD bill, threatening 
to filibuster if the proposal was removed from the bill.76  Senator Kennedy 
was not, however, the most notable promoter of the proposal.  President 
Clinton also showed his support for parity, sending a letter to Speaker of the 
House Newt Gingrich “urging the House to quickly enact several important 
 
visited Sept. 7, 2010).  Senator Domenici’s wife, Nancy Domenici, was a NAMI board 
member.  Levinson & Druss, supra note 5, at 139. 
 69. The CFMIC is “an aggregation of mental health special interest groups” consisting of 
mental health professionals, consumers, and health care businesses.  Levinson & Druss, supra 
note 5, at 139. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 140 (discussing how mental health parity eventually passed in the Senate as an 
amendment to the Kennedy-Kassebaum bill that later became PL 104-191); see Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L.No. 104-191, 110 STAT. 1936 
(1996); see also Health Insurance Reform Act of 1995, S. 1028, 104th Cong. (1995). 
 72. Levinson & Druss, supra note 5, at 140-41. 
 73. Mari C. Kjorstad, The Current and Future State of Mental Health Insurance Parity 
Legislation, 27 PSYCHIATRIC REHABILITATION J. 34, 35 (2003). 
 74. Id.  Likely the bill never stood a chance as its own piece of legislation.  The two 
instances where it garnered the most support – including the occasion of its passage – came 
when it was attached to bills that would demand much more debate on the congressional 
floor:  as an amendment to the Health Insurance Reform Act and as an amendment to an 
appropriations bill. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Levinson & Druss, supra note 5, at 141. 
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health reform provisions that were passed by the Senate;”77 Clinton was 
referring to the amendments eliminated from the Kennedy-Kassebaum bill.78 
Gingrich, along with Republican Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, 
agreed to meet with the parity backers, and the two worked with Domenici 
and Wellstone in order to create an amendment that would be able to pass 
both houses of Congress.79  With the support of Senator Kennedy and 
President Clinton, among others, and the assistance of certain opponents in 
crafting an agreeable piece of legislation, both Houses of Congress passed 
mental health parity as an amendment to the VA/HUD bill, and President 
Clinton signed parity into law on September 26, 1996.80  While mental 
health advocates and some lawmakers celebrated the removal of unfair 
barriers to equal care for mental health services, the compromises required 
to achieve passage through Congress minimized the effect the MHPA would 
have on health care coverage.81 
During the years that followed the passage of the MHPA, it became 
clear that the effects of the law were “primarily symbolic rather than 
substantive.”82  The compromises hammered out during the meetings 
between Domenici, Wellstone, Gingrich, and Lott proved too much for the 
law to overcome.  The exceptions, designed to appease parity opponents, 
devoured the rule.  The failure of true parity from the MHPA can be 
assigned to the fact that the law fell victim to the same fate as many other 
pieces of health care legislation, namely, “idealistic access goals bargained 
away and dismantled by cost-containment concerns,”83 a trend one 
commentator has termed “legislative schizophrenia.”84 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 142. 
 81. See Daniel P. Gitterman et al., Does the Sunset of Mental Health Parity Really 
Matter?, 28 ADMIN. & POL’Y MENTAL HEALTH 353, 355 (2001) [hereinafter Gitterman et al., 
Sunset of Mental Health Parity] (explaining that mental health advocates and law/policy 
makers thought the unfair barriers to mental health services had been removed by MHPA, 
which would have been a reason to celebrate; but the conferees were able to minimize the 
effect of MHPA with several provisions). 
 82. Gitterman et al., Full Mental Health Parity, supra note 51, at 68. 
 83. Maggie D. Gold, Must Insurers Treat All Illnesses Equally? – Mental vs. Physical 
Illness: Congressional and Administrative Failure to End Limitations to and Exclusions from 
Coverage for Mental Illness in Employer-Provided Health Benefits Under the Mental Health 
Parity Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 767, 771 (1998) (citing 
Christopher Aaron Jones, Legislative “Subterfuge”?: Failing to Insure Persons with Mental 
Illness Under the Mental Health Parity Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 50 VAND. L. 
REV. 753, 757 (1997)). 
 84. Jones, supra note 83, at 757 n. 23 (citing James F. Blumstein, Court Action, Agency 
Reaction: The Hill-Burton Act as a Case Study, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1227, 1227 (1984)). 
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The exceptions to and exclusions from the MHPA are nearly countless 
and were noticeable from the outset, essentially rendering the amendments 
to ERISA and the PHSA meaningless.85  The supporters of the MHPA cannot 
be blamed for its failure to create true parity; the opponents simply had too 
much power in their corner, and thus too many accommodations were 
required to pass the bill.  Business and insurance industry lobbyists86 as well 
as fiscal and social conservatives believed that a true parity bill would have 
a negative impact on their industries and constituents, respectively.  Thus, 
the MHPA represented a substantially watered-down effort toward parity. 
First, the concessions lobbied for by Gingrich and Lott, and accepted by 
Domenici and Wellstone, allowed for one year between enactment and 
implementation of the bill.87  This meant that measurement of the potential 
effects of the MHPA could not begin until January 1, 1998.88  Furthermore, 
the law contained a sunset provision at the time of the enactment, which 
meant the law would only guarantee four years of parity.89  Business 
lobbyists were mollified through the addition of “new company” and “small 
business” exceptions.90  The small business exception exempted companies 
who employed 50 or fewer employees during a plan year.91  Therefore, a 
group health plan for a company with 50 employees was required to offer 
no mental health parity whatsoever.  Moreover, companies not in existence 
prior to enactment of the law would be exempt from the requirements of the 
MHPA if they predicted they would fall within the small business exception.92 
These exceptions arguably were only the tip of the iceberg.  The MHPA 
failed to mandate inclusion of any mental health benefits and, in fact, only 
applied to insurance plans that already offered mental health benefits.93  
The language of the MHPA is unambiguous: “[n]othing in this section shall 
be construed as requiring a group health plan (or health insurance 
 
 85. See 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 47, at 5, 7-8 (Exceptions and the narrow scope 
of MHPA have allowed employers to be in compliance while still making reductions in mental 
health benefits for employees, which means that the amendments have a limited effect on 
employees’ access to mental health benefits.). 
 86. See Judith Havemann, Businesses Oppose Parity for Mental Health Benefits: Provision 
in Senate Measure Seen as Too Costly, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 1996, at A1 (naming the 
lobbyists working for the nation’s major employers as the National Association of 
Manufacturers, the ERISA Industry Committee, the Chamber of Commerce, and the American 
Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans). 
 87. Levinson & Druss, supra note 5, at 141. 
 88. Id. at 142. 
 89. See id.  (Four years of guaranteed parity from its inception on January 1, 1998 to its 
sunset on September 30, 2001.). 
 90. Id. at 141. 
 91. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(c)(1)(B) (2006). 
 92. See, e.g., § 1185a(c)(1)(C)(ii). 
 93. Levinson & Druss, supra note 5, at 141-42. 
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coverage offered in connection with such a plan) to provide any mental 
health benefits.”94  While the law did apply to insurance plans that offered 
mental health benefits, nothing in the law precluded these plans from simply 
discontinuing mental health benefits altogether.  Nevertheless, if a company 
decided to continue offering mental health benefits in conformity with the 
MHPA, the Act provided another exception in the event the company 
regretted that decision.  If an insurance plan showed a 1% increase in the 
overall cost of the plan as a result of compliance with the MHPA, the plan 
would no longer be required to comply with the law.95  Furthermore, under 
the MHPA, the insurance plan itself would dictate which conditions would 
constitute the term mental illness and which treatments would be covered.96 
More important than what the MHPA explicitly exempted were the 
aspects of mental health coverage it failed to address.  The MHPA did not 
apply to coverage for treatment for substance abuse or chemical 
dependency.97  While the concession to remove coverage for these 
disorders from the MHPA was likely a personal blow to Senator Wellstone, it 
was almost certainly a heavier blow to 50% of the mentally ill population 
who, like Wellstone’s brother, also suffer from substance abuse problems.98  
For these individuals the MHPA ensured, at best, a partial correction of the 
disparate coverage they faced in obtaining health insurance. 
The MHPA also failed the mentally ill population by neglecting to fully 
address the myriad manners in which insurance plans could discriminate 
against the mentally ill.  Under the MHPA, parity only applied to aggregate 
lifetime and annual coverage limits.99  If a plan failed to include lifetime 
 
 94. 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(b)(1). 
 95. See § 1185a(c)(2) (“Increased cost exemption.  This section shall not apply with 
respect to a group health plan (or health insurance coverage offered in connection with a 
group health plan) if the application of this section to such plan (or to such coverage) results 
in an increase in the cost under the plan (or for such coverage) of at least 1 percent.”). 
 96. See § 1185a(e)(4) (“Mental health benefits.  The term ‘mental health benefits’ means 
benefits with respect to mental health services, as defined under the terms of the plan or 
coverage (as the case may be), but does not include benefits with respect to treatment of 
substance abuse or chemical dependency.”) (emphasis added); see also Jacobi, supra note 
64, at 192 (discussing that the MHPA is a ‘very mild law’ because it does not mandate any 
health coverage). 
 97. 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(e)(4) (“Mental health benefits.  The term ‘mental health benefits’ 
means benefits with respect to mental health services, as defined under the terms of the plan 
or coverage (as the case may be), but does not include benefits with respect to treatment of 
substance abuse or chemical dependency.”) (emphasis added). 
 98. Nat’l Alliance on Mental Illness, Dual Diagnosis: Substance Abuse and Mental Illness 
[hereinafter NAMI Dual Diagnosis Report], www.nami.org/Content/ContentGroups/Helpline 
1/Dual_Diagnosis_-_Substance_Abuse_and_Mental_Illness.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2010). 
 99. Levinson & Druss, supra note 5, at 142.  “The term ‘aggregate lifetime limit’ means, 
with respect to benefits under a group health plan or health insurance coverage, a dollar 
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limits on medical or surgical benefits,100 it could not impose lifetime limits 
on mental health benefits.101  If a plan did impose lifetime limits on medical 
or surgical benefits, the plan could not distinguish between medical or 
surgical benefits and mental health benefits and could not apply lower limits 
to mental health benefits.102  The same restrictions applied to annual 
limits.103  Lifetime and annual benefits parity were the only such parity 
requirements the MHPA created.  Not only did the law implicitly allow 
insurance providers to continue discrimination in other aspects of parity 
legislation; rather, the language of the MHPA appeared to encourage other 
forms of discrimination, including higher deductibles, higher copayments, 
and limits on hospital stays.104  In this manner, the law utterly failed the 
 
limitation on the total amount that may be paid with respect to such benefits under the plan or 
health insurance coverage with respect to an individual or other coverage unit.”  29 U.S.C. 
§1185a.(e)(1).  “The term ‘annual limit’ means, with respect to benefits under a group health 
plan or health insurance coverage, a dollar limitation on the total amount of benefits that may 
be paid with respect to such benefits in a 12-month period under the plan or health insurance 
coverage with respect to an individual or other coverage unit.”  §1185a.(e)(2). 
 100. See § 1185a(e)(3).  The MHPA left the determination of which benefits fell into these 
categories to the insurance plans.  § 1185a(e)(3) (“The term ‘medical or surgical benefits’ 
means benefits with respect to medical or surgical services, as defined under the terms of the 
plan or coverage (as the case may be), but does not include mental health benefits.”). 
 101. 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(a)(1)(A) (2006) (“If the plan or coverage does not include an 
aggregate lifetime limit on substantially all medical and surgical benefits, the plan or coverage 
may not impose any aggregate lifetime limit on mental health benefits.”). 
 102. § 1185a(a)(1)(B) (“If the plan or coverage includes an aggregate lifetime limit on 
substantially all medical and surgical benefits (in this paragraph referred to as the ‘applicable 
lifetime limit’), the plan or coverage shall either – (i) apply the applicable lifetime limit both to 
the medical and surgical benefits to which it otherwise would apply and to mental health 
benefits and not distinguish in the application of such limit between such medical and surgical 
benefits and mental health benefits; or (ii) not include any aggregate lifetime limit on mental 
health benefits that is less than the applicable lifetime limit.”). 
 103. § 1185a(a)(2)(A) (“If the plan or coverage does not include an annual limit on 
substantially all medical and surgical benefits, the plan or coverage may not impose any 
annual limit on mental health benefits.”); see also § 1185a.(a)(2)(B) (“If the plan or coverage 
includes an annual limit on substantially all medical and surgical benefits (in this paragraph 
referred to as the ‘applicable annual limit’), the plan or coverage shall either – (i) apply the 
applicable annual limit both to medical and surgical benefits to which it otherwise would apply 
and to mental health benefits and not distinguish in the application of such limit between such 
medical and surgical benefits and mental health benefits; or (ii) not include any annual limit 
on mental health benefits that is less than the applicable annual limit.”). 
 104. § 1185a(b)(2) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed – in the case of a group 
health plan (or health insurance coverage offered in connection with such a plan) that 
provides mental health benefits, as affecting the terms and conditions (including cost sharing, 
limits on numbers of visits or days of coverage, and requirements relating to medical necessity) 
relating to the amount, duration, or scope of mental health benefits under the plan or 
coverage, except as specifically provided in subsection (a) of this section (in regard to parity in 
the imposition of aggregate lifetime limits and annual limits for mental health benefits).”). 
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mentally ill population by not merely creating loopholes for companies and 
insurance plans to pass through, but by essentially guiding these entities 
through the loopholes. 
While proponents of the law lauded its passage,105 it seemed clear from 
the language of the MHPA that the loopholes created would limit its effect.  
This appearance would prove true as the numerous exemptions within the 
MHPA created a law with extremely narrow scope, thus causing it to have 
little or no impact on most employees’ access to mental health services.106  
This lack of meaningful impact was created by insurance plans that replaced 
dollar limits on annual and lifetime benefits coverage with equivalent dollar 
limits on inpatient hospital stays and outpatient office visits, among other 
restrictions.107  According to the 2000 General Accounting Office (GAO) 
report, 87% of plans that were in compliance with the MHPA contained at 
least one design feature that was more restrictive for mental health benefits 
than for medical and surgical benefits.108  Thus, while the efforts of 
Wellstone and Domenici were admirable, the true impact of the MHPA was 
negligible. 
Likely partially due to the insignificant effect of the law, and partially due 
to the fact that the MHPA was much weaker than the original law Wellstone 
and Domenici tried to pass in 1992,109 the next twelve years saw repeated 
attempts to correct the errors.  In 1997, the year after the MHPA was passed 
and the year prior to its enactment, Senators Wellstone and Domenici 
introduced an amendment that would have required State Children’s Health 
Insurance Plans (SCHIPs) to provide full-parity coverage for mental health 
benefits.110  The bill never passed the Senate.111  That same year, 
 
 105. See Press Release, Nat’l Alliance on Mental Illness, Mental Health Parity Act to Take 
Effect at Midnight (Dec. 31, 1997) [hereinafter NAMI Press Release], www.nami.org/Template. 
cfm?Section=Press_Release_Archive&template=/contentmanagement/contentdisplay.cfm&Co
ntentID=5587&title=Mental%20Health%20Parity%20Act%20To%20Take%20Effect%20At%2
0Midnight (quoting NAMI Executive Director Laurie Flynn as saying, “The days of [mental 
health patients] being cast as second-class citizens from a health care system historically 
indifferent to their needs are over.”). 
 106. Gitterman et al., Sunset of Mental Health Parity, supra note 81, at 356. 
 107. Id.  See also 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 47, at 5. 
 108. Gitterman et al., Sunset of Mental Health Parity, supra note 81, at 356 (citing 2000 
GAO REPORT, supra note 47, at 5). 
 109. The Equitable Health Care for Severe Mental Illnesses Act of 1992, S. 2696, 102d 
Cong. (1992).  Aimed at creating nondiscriminatory legislation, the bill, introduced by 
Senators Domenici and Danforth, applied to severe mental illnesses and mandated mental 
healthcare coverage that would not be “more restrictive than coverage provided for other 
major physical illnesses.”  S. 2696. 
 110. RAMYA SUNDARARAMAN & C. STEPHEN REDHEAD, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: THE 
MENTAL HEALTH PARITY ACT: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 6 (2007) [hereinafter CRS REPORT], available 
at edlabor.house.gov/testimony/071007MentalHealthParityCRSReport.pdf. 
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Representative Pete Stark introduced the National Mental Health Parity Act 
of 1997 on the floor of the House.112  The language of that bill was the 
same as a bill Rep. Stark entered during the previous legislative session, and 
it would have required group health plans to cover all mental illnesses listed 
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition 
(DSM-IV).113  On March 26, 1998, an Act entitled the Mental Health and 
Substance Abuse Parity Amendments of 1998 was introduced.114  This bill 
would have amended the MHPA to require full parity for both mental health 
and substance abuse,115 but it would not have mandated coverage.116 
The 106th Congress saw the introduction of four more mental health 
parity bills, none of which was taken up by either House.117  In 1999, 
however, President Clinton issued Executive Order 13,124 directing the 
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to implement full parity for mental 
health benefits in all plans offered by the Federal Employees Health Benefits 
Program.118  This Order required all FEHBP plans to cover medically 
necessary treatments for all mental illnesses listed in the DSM-IV.119  Two 
years later, with the MHPA preparing to sunset, Senators Domenici and 
Wellstone introduced the Mental Health Equitable Treatment Act of 2001 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. H.R. 621, 105th Cong. § 9901 (1997). 
 113. H.R. 4045, 104th Cong. § 9901 (1996). 
 114. H.R. 3568, 105th Cong. (1998). 
 115. H.R. 3568 (stating that the purpose of the amendment was “to prohibit group and 
individual health plans from imposing treatment limitations or financial requirements on the 
coverage of mental health benefits and on the coverage of substance abuse and chemical 
dependency benefits if similar limitations or requirements are not imposed on medical and 
surgical benefits”); CRS REPORT, supra note 110, at 6. 
 116. CRS REPORT, supra note 110, at 6 (stating that full parity coverage is only required for 
plans that offer mental health and substance abuse coverage). 
 117. Id. at 7.  See also Mental Health Equitable Treatment Act of 1999, S. 796, 106th 
Cong. § 2 (1999) (amending the MHPA to require parity in inpatient days and outpatient 
visits, as well as full parity for severe biological mental illnesses); Mental Health and Substance 
Abuse Parity Amendments of 1999, H.R. 1515, 106th Cong. § 2(a) (1999) (amending 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 28 U.S.C. § 1185(a), to require 
full parity for mental health benefits); Mental Health Parity Enhancement Act of 1999, H.R. 
2445, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999) (amending ERISA, Public Health Service Act, and Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 to require parity for treatment limitations); National Mental Health 
Parity Act of 1999, H.R. 2593, 106th Cong. § 9901 (1999) (using language originally 
introduced by Rep. Stark in previous Acts). 
 118. See Exec. Order No. 13,124, 3 C.F.R. 192 (2000), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 3301 
(2000); see also Remarks at the White House Conference on Mental Health, 1 PUB. PAPERS 
896 (June 7, 1999) (President Clinton ensured that all federal employees would receive full 
mental health benefits.). 
 119. CRS REPORT, supra note 110, at 7. 
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which would require full parity for all DSM-IV diagnoses.120  Importantly, 
while the Congressional Budget Office predicted a four percent increase in 
overall healthcare premiums as a result of the MHPA,121 the CBO predicted 
only a 0.9% increase as a result of this new legislation.122  Even so, the 
House rejected the Senate bill, and instead voted to reauthorize the MHPA 
for another year.123  In 2002, another parity bill was introduced in the 
House,124 but the only further action taken was the reauthorization of the 
MHPA through the end of 2003.125 
The next Congress further extended the MHPA through the end of 
2005.126  Three additional bills were introduced but went nowhere.127  The 
109th Congress played the same part, with the House failing to pass the 
Paul Wellstone Mental Health Equitable Treatment Act of 2005,128 the 
Senate failing to introduce any legislation, and two House bills extending the 
MPHA provisions through 2007.129  While every Congress from the 102nd 
through the 110th introduced mental health parity legislation, almost always 
in each House, only two were successful in becoming law.  The 104th 
Congress passed the MHPA,130 and in 2008, the 110th Congress passed 
the MHPAEA near the end of its legislative session.131 
 
 120. S. 543, 107th Cong. § 2(f)(3) (2001). 
 121. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO’S ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACT ON EMPLOYERS OF THE 
MENTAL HEALTH PARITY AMENDMENT IN H.R. 3101 1 (1996) [hereinafter H.R 3103 COST 
ESTIMATE], available at http://www.gov/publications/bysubject.cfm?cat=9. 
 122. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE: S. 543: MENTAL HEALTH EQUITABLE TREATMENT 
ACT OF 2001 3 (2001) [hereinafter S. 543 COST ESTIMATE], available at http://www.cbo.gov/ 
ftpdocs/30xx/doc3013/s543.pdf. 
 123. CRS REPORT, supra note 110, at 8. 
 124. Mental Health Equitable Treatment Act of 2002, H.R. 4066, 107th Cong. (2002). 
 125. CRS REPORT, supra note 110, at 8. 
 126. See Mental Health Parity Reauthorization Act of 2003, S. 1929, 108th Cong. § 2 
(2003) (continuing the MHPA provisions of ERISA and PHSA through 2004); Working Families 
Tax Relief Act of 2004, H.R. 1308, 108th Cong. § 302 (2004) (continuing the MHPA 
provisions of ERISA and PHSA through 2005). 
 127. Senator Daschle introduced S. 10, Health Care Coverage Expansion and Quality 
Improvement Act of 2003, Representatives Kennedy and Ramstad and Senators Domenici and 
Kennedy introduced H.R. 953/S. 486, Senator Paul Wellstone Mental Health Equitable 
Treatment Act of 2003, in February 2003, and Senator Daschle introduced S. 1832, Senator 
Paul Wellstone Mental Health Equitable Treatment Act of 2003, in November 2003.  CRS 
REPORT, supra note 110, at 9-10. 
 128. H.R. 1402, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 129. CRS REPORT, supra note 110, at 10. 
 130. RAMYA SUNDARARAMAN, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: MENTAL HEALTH PARITY: AN 
OVERVIEW 4 (2008). 
 131. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, MENTAL HEALTH PARITY: AN 
OVERVIEW, 4 (2008) (“[K]ey negotiators in the Senate used H.R. 1424, the original mental 
health parity legislation passed in the House in the 110th Congress, as the vehicle to pass the 
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The reasons for the lack of meaningful impact from the MHPA seem 
obvious: the exceptions to parity swallowed the rule of parity.  The reason 
for the failure of any new legislation to be passed during the twelve years 
after enactment of this law seems less obvious.  While numerous exceptions 
were created to dampen the MHPA’s parity impact, it appears that one key 
rationale existed for the creation of its exemptions and for subsequent 
legislative failures.  As mentioned, aside from the business and insurance 
lobbyists, fiscal conservatives supplied much of the opposition to mental 
health parity legislation.  The interests of these groups seem patently 
aligned.  Businesses and insurance companies, for obvious reasons, seek to 
keep costs at a minimum, and fiscal conservatives, as their moniker 
suggests, are concerned with the overall costs of government.  Thus, the 
uncertain price tag of true mental health parity has remained a constant 
barrier to parity legislation. 
The following section will address the issue of cost with regard to the 
passage of parity legislation, both how cost concerns affected the language 
of the MHPA and how these concerns helped create a twelve year gap 
between passage of the MHPA and its predecessor, the MHPAEA.  It will 
also address the two main cost counterarguments presented by parity 
proponents and the irony that stems from the opposition’s cost argument; 
namely that, while opponents of parity legislation decry its potential for 
increasing health care coverage costs, proponents of parity point to 
evidence that health care costs are already dramatically higher due to the 
lack of parity in coverage of mental illness. 
B. The Cost of Parity – Is There Another Side to the Coin? 
Throughout the nearly two decades parity legislation has been 
considered on Capitol Hill and in state legislatures, the cost of true parity in 
insurance coverage has been the most debated concern.  The prohibitive 
cost argument has always been the driving force behind efforts of business 
and insurance lobbyists to prevent passage of any parity legislation, 
eventually resulting in the diluted legislation that was the MHPA.132  And 
 
compromised mental health parity legislation within the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
of 2008). 
 132. See, e.g., Small Business Backs Health Care Compromise, U.S. NEWSWIRE, June 19, 
1996.  The National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) supported a health care 
reform compromise, but did not support any form of mental health parity mandate.  Id.  The 
health care compromise that the NFIB backed was the Kennedy-Kassabaum measure 
discussed supra at Section II.A.  Id.  Using strong language to show the organization’s stance 
on mental health parity, NFIB President Jack Faris said, “Any form of the mental health 
provision is a poison pill to the health care compromise . . . Mandating costly mental health 
benefits defeats the very purpose of health care reform which is to lower health care costs and 
to insure more people.”  Id. 
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while the MHPAEA is certainly a much more extensive step toward true 
parity, cost was likely still the main issue that kept the new Act from 
achieving its full potential.  Business and insurance lobbyists do not argue 
against parity mandates solely because of the debatable effect on premium 
costs.  Rather, these entities also resist mental health parity because mental 
health services, they argue, are imprecise; and “diagnosis, prognosis, and 
treatment decisions seemed to rely on disparate and untested 
understandings of the nature of mental illness.”133 
Fear of cost increases for insurance companies, employers, and 
employees is a justifiable concern, especially considering the current global 
economic conditions;134 nevertheless, supporters raise at least two cost 
arguments of their own, and these arguments appear to be downplayed by 
the opposition.  The first cost argument of parity proponents began while 
trying to enact the original parity legislation that eventually became the 
MHPA.  That argument was that the opposition’s prediction for cost 
increases were dramatically inflated, and actual cost increases would be 
much lower than opponents predicted.135  While that argument essentially 
remains today, it has become much more pointed.  Researchers on the 
subject have stated the current pro-parity cost argument succinctly: 
“[o]pposition to parity on the basis of increased total spending no longer 
constitutes an evidence-based objection.”136  Put more directly, the first 
argument now is that those who maintain a cost-based stance against parity 
are simply incorrect.  The second cost argument that supporters advance is 
that failing to treat mental illness actually creates substantial direct and 
indirect societal costs that outweigh any potential increase in cost resulting 
from expansion of mental health treatment.137 
 
 133. Jacobi, supra note 64, at 193.  See also, supra Section I for discussion of why this 
argument is likely unsupportable. 
 134. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. §§ 
511, 512 (2008) (including the MHPAEA as a special tax provision of the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008). 
 135. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE: H.R. 1424: PAUL WELLSTONE MENTAL 
HEALTH AND ADDICTION EQUITY ACT OF 2007 7 (2007), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftp 
docs/88xx/doc8837/hr1424ec.pdf (predicting full benefits parity would increase employer-
based health insurance premiums by only 0.4%).  But see Dana L. Kaplan, Can Legislation 
Alone Solve America’s Mental Health Dilemma? Current State Legislative Schemes Cannot 
Achieve Mental Health Parity, 8 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 325, 337 (2005) (citing a 2003 
report from the Commerce & Industry Association of New Jersey that predicted mandated 
mental health coverage would create a 20% increase in costs). 
 136. See Colleen L. Barry et al., The Costs of Mental Health Parity: Still an Impediment?, 
25 HEALTH AFF. 623, 632 (2006). 
 137. See SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 411-13.  “In 1996 the United 
States spent more than $99 billion for the direct treatment of mental disorders, as well as 
substance abuse, and Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias . . . . More than two-thirds of 
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Which interest group one speaks to will determine the answer to whether 
full parity is affordable.138  Opponents to mandated mental health parity 
include trade organizations, businesses, and insurance associations.139  
These groups cite certain studies and reports to support their contention that 
parity will result in extreme increases in insurance costs;140 they argue that 
mandated parity in insurance coverage is simply too costly to be a viable 
option.  Aside from the obvious reasons why cost increases are disliked by 
policyholders, opponents to parity legislation argue that any cost increase in 
the voluntary health insurance market results in a subsequent decrease in 
coverage.141  In this way, parity opponents appear to be making an altruistic 
argument.  By maintaining disparate coverage levels, insurance companies 
are actually allowing more individuals to be insured.  As laudable as this 
argument appears, it is only supportable if increasing parity actually 
increases costs. 
Opposing mental health parity because of potentially devastating cost 
increases likely was a more credible argument when the MHPA was passed 
in 1996 than it is today.  This is largely due to the advent of managed care 
and its ever-increasing role in the insurance industry.  The cost of mental 
health insurance has been defined by two eras of economic research.142  
The first era includes research from the 1970s through the 1980s, and the 
second era comprises research from the mid-1990s forward.143  
Historically—that is, during the first era of research—the purpose of such 
studies was to determine the effect of prices on the demand for mental 
healthcare.144  Researchers sought to determine whether lower prices of 
care, as a result of increased coverage of certain mental illnesses and 
corresponding treatments, would increase overall demand for such care and 
 
this amount ($69 billion or more than 7 percent of total health spending) was for mental 
health services.”  Id. at 412. 
 138. See Kaplan, supra note 135, at 333-42. 
 139. Id. at 337. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO’s ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACT ON EMPLOYERS OF THE 
MENTAL HEALTH PARITY AMENDMENT IN H.R. 3103 4 (1996), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ 
doc.cfm?index=10603 (estimating that the parity requirement could result in 400,000 fewer 
workers having employment based coverage). 
 142. See Barry et al., supra note 136, at 625. 
 143. Id. (noting that the first era, during the 1970s and 1980s, encompasses research 
prior to the managed care era, and the second era, from the mid-1990s to present day, 
essentially is the managed care era). 
 144. Id. 
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treatment.145  More recently, however, research has focused on “natural 
experiments” to determine the effect of managed care on parity coverage.146 
The opposition to mental health parity has long stemmed from insurers’ 
fear that full coverage of mental healthcare and treatment would drive up 
premium costs.147  The fear of higher premium costs led to exclusions and 
limitations in coverage of mental illnesses, beginning when insurance 
providers first offered mental health coverage.148  These exclusions and 
limitations were accepted, especially early on, because state governments 
remained largely responsible for the mental health system.149  Insurers’ 
concerns regarding the potential for increases in costs and resulting higher 
premiums were buttressed by a series of studies throughout the 1980s on 
price elasticity of demand for mental healthcare.150  Five sets of study results 
published between 1981 and 1989 all showed substantially higher price 
elasticity for mental health services than for general health services.151  This 
meant that as the price to the consumer of mental healthcare services 
increased, the demand for such services correspondingly decreased at a 
greater rate than the demand for general healthcare services.152 
These results created the justification that insurance providers needed to 
dramatically increase discrimination against mental healthcare services 
ostensibly as a cost containment measure.  In 1981, when the first of the 
price elasticity studies was reported, forty-one percent of full-time employee 
 
 145. Id. at 625-626. 
 146. Id. at 625 (defining “natural experiments” as the means by which current researchers 
obtain their data; specifically, some current studies are carried out by comparing individuals 
residing in states with comprehensive parity statutes with individuals in states without such 
statutes). 
 147. Barry et al., supra note 136, at 625 (finding that the resistance to equal coverage has 
existed since the 1950s when major medical contracts first began offering mental health 
coverage in any form). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Richard G. Frank et al., Will Parity in Coverage Result in Better Mental Health Care?, 
345 N. ENG. J. MED. 1701, 1701 (noting that in 1956, the state-based public mental health 
system accounted for about eighty-five percent of mental health expenditures). 
 150. See Barry et al., supra note 136, at 626-27.  Barry reviewed five studies comparing 
the price elasticity of demand for mental healthcare against the price elasticity of demand for 
general healthcare.  Id.  The price elasticity of demand describes the percentage change in 
quantity of products or services demanded by consumers—in this case, mental health or 
general health services—relative to the change in price of those products or services. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See Gold, supra note 83, at 773-77 (discussing the arguments of opponents and 
advocates of parity with regard to “moral hazard” – a consumer behavior related cost theory 
related to the price elasticity of demand, which says that demand will increase as plan 
generosity increases and discussing “adverse selection” – the fear that if some plans offer 
more mental health benefits, those plans will attract a greater proportion of higher cost 
populations, resulting in a decrease in coverage or increase in premium costs). 
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participants in plans with mental health benefits were subject to separate 
limitations on hospital care, and eighty-three percent of these plan 
participants were subject to separate limitations on outpatient care.153  By 
1995, the year prior to enactment of the MHPA, eighty-one percent of full-
time employees in medium and large private establishments were subject to 
separate limitations on coverage for inpatient care, and ninety-six percent of 
these employees faced separate limitations on coverage for outpatient 
care.154 
Insurance providers have not used only the price elasticity studies to 
foster their argument against parity.  Countless studies were conducted in 
the past fifteen years to determine the percentage increase in total health 
plan expenses that would result from mental health parity.  Many of these 
studies resulted in statistics that appeared to support the position of business 
and insurance industry lobbyists, especially in the early to mid-1990s.  
However, many of these studies resulted in statistics that support parity.  In 
fact, as time passes, the general argument that parity will increase overall 
health plan expenses becomes less and less viable. 
In preparation for debates prior to passage of the MHPA, the 
Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans (APPWP), however, 
concluded that direct health plan expenses would increase with the 
expansion of mental health care coverage.155  It suggested that parity in 
coverage of serious mental illnesses alone would result in an eight to eleven 
percent increase in total health plan expenses.156  Four additional actuarial 
studies in 1996 further confused the cost debate by widening the range of 
the estimated increase in health insurance premiums to be expected from 
the MHPA.  A Coopers and Lybrand study predicted a 3.2 percent 
increase;157 Milliman and Robertson, Inc., estimated a 3.9 percent 
increase;158 the Congressional Budget Office predicted a 4 percent 
increase;159 and, Price Waterhouse estimated an 8.7 percent increase.160  
 
 153. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN MEDIUM AND 
LARGE FIRMS, 1981 1, 27 tbl. 26 (1982) (reporting statistics for full-time employees in medium 
and large establishments depending on the industry). 
 154. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN MEDIUM AND 
LARGE PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, 1995 71 tbl. 75 (1998). 
 155. Watson Wyatt Worldwide, Ass’n of Private Pension & Welfare Plans, Action Ctr. for 
Quality Health Care, The Costs of Uniform Plan Provisions for Medical and Mental Health 
Services: An Analysis of S. 298, the “Equitable Health Care for Severe Mental Illness Act” 1 
(1996) (unpublished study) (on file with author). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Merrile Sing and Steven C. Hill, The Costs of Parity Mandates for Mental Health and 
Substance Abuse Insurance Benefits, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 437, 437 (2001). 
 158. Id. 
 159. H.R. 3103 COST ESTIMATE, supra note 122, at 1. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
366 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 3:343 
These massive differences in cost projections—from less than four percent to 
eleven percent—resulted in the addition of the cost increase safety provision 
of the MHPA; if a covered entity experienced a premium increase of more 
than one percent as a result of parity costs, it would not be required to 
comply with the Act.161 
This numbers game has continued throughout the period between 
passage of the MHPA and the MHPAEA.  According to a 2002 study by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers for the American Association of Health Plans, 
health insurance premiums for large employers increased by 13.7% between 
2001 and 2002.162  This large increase in overall health insurance 
premiums has spurred the belief that increased access to health care 
coverage—mental health care in particular—will result in employers 
reducing overall benefits offered, shifting costs to employees, or canceling 
healthcare coverage entirely.163 
Proponents of mental health parity rely on substantial research that 
shows the true cost of parity is much less than even the lowest predictions 
advanced in preparation for the MHPA debates.  In June 2000, the 
National Advisory Mental Health Council’s Report to Congress projected a 
1.4 percent increase as a result of full parity for mental health benefits.164  
However, it is likely that even this projection was inflated as it was still based 
on actuarial and economic forecasting models, rather than actual numbers 
presented as a result of the publication of State and large-employer parity 
experiences.165  A little over a year later, in August 2001, the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO), which in 1996 predicted a four percent increase in 
health insurance premiums as a result of the MHPA, released its Cost 
Estimate166 for the Mental Health Equitable Treatment Act of 2001 
 
 160. Ronald E. Bachman, Pricewaterhouse Coopers, An Actuarial Analysis of S. 543: 
Mental Health Equitable Treatment Act of 2001 18 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author). 
 161. 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(c)(2) (2000). 
 162. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, THE FACTORS FUELING RISING HEALTHCARE COSTS: 2008 4 
(2008), available at http://www.ahip.org/content/default.aspx?docid=25123 (finding, 
however, that the increase was less dramatic between 2004 and 2005, at only 8.8%). 
 163. Merrile Sing & Steven C. Hill, The Costs of Parity Mandates for Mental Health and 
Substance Abuse Insurance Benefits, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 437, 440 (2001). 
 164. RUTH L. KIRSCHSTEIN, DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INSURANCE PARITY FOR MENTAL 
HEALTH: COST, ACCESS, AND QUALITY: FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS BY THE NATIONAL ADVISORY 
MENTAL HEALTH COUNCIL 3, 32, 33 (2000) [hereinafter NAMHC REPORT], available at 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/advisory-boards-and-groups/namhc/reports/nimh-parity.pdf. 
 165. See id. at 10; Kevin D. Hennessy & Howard H. Goldman, Full Parity: Steps Toward 
Treatment Equity for Mental and Addictive Disorders, HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 2001, at 58, 62. 
 166. S. 543 COST ESTIMATE, supra note 122, at 1. 
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(MHETA).167  The CBO estimated that the MHETA would increase group 
health insurance premiums by an average of 0.9%.168  That same month, 
the American Psychological Association retained PricewaterhouseCoopers to 
analyze the potential added cost for coverage under the MHETA.169  
According to its analysis, PricewaterhouseCoopers determined that mental 
health coverage on par with physical health coverage would increase 
employers’ costs by one percent, or $1.32 per employee per month.170  
When the CBO released its Cost Estimates for the 2007 versions of mental 
health parity legislation,171 it had decreased the predicted increase in health 
care premiums to 0.4%.172 
While even some supporters of parity state that it is “undeniable” that 
parity for the treatment of mental illness will raise insurance costs,173 this 
sentiment is no longer held by many on the advocates’ side of the debate.  
Managed behavioral health companies (MBHCs) have had a substantial 
effect on the actual costs of current mental health and the predicted costs of 
mental health parity.174  By 1999, 177 million Americans’ mental health 
 
 167. S. 543, 107th Cong. (2001) (One of the most comprehensive proposals this Act 
contained mandated full parity for all mental illnesses covered under the Diagnostic & 
Statistics Manual for Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV)). 
 168. S. 543 COST ESTIMATE, supra note 122, at 3. 
 169. Mathew G. Simon, Not All Illnesses Are Treated Equally—Does a Disability Benefits 
Plan Violate the ADA by Providing Less Generous Long-Term Benefits for Mentally Disabled 
Employees than for Physically Disabled Employees?, 8 U. PA. J. LABOR & EMP. L, 943, 975 
(2006). 
 170. Bachman, supra note 160, at 6. 
 171. See SUNDARARAMAN, supra note 130, at 3-4 (discussing that the Mental Health Parity 
Act of 2007 (S. 558) and the Paul Wellstone Mental Health and Addiction Equity Act of 2007 
(H.R. 1424 ) were both predecessors of the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health 
Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008). 
 172. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE: H.R. 1424: 
PAUL WELLSTONE MENTAL HEALTH AND ADDICTION EQUITY ACT OF 2007 4 (2007), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/88xx/doc8837/hr1424ec.pdf. 
 173. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 169, at 975 (“It is undeniable that parity . . . will cost 
insurers more.”); see also Brian D. Shannon, Paving the Path to Parity in Health Insurance 
Coverage for Mental Illness: New Law or Merely Good Intentions?, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 63, 
92 (1997) (“It is undeniable that the inclusion of expanded coverage for the treatment of 
mental illness . . . will cost money.”). 
 174. See Barry, supra note 136, at 632 (“[P]arity implemented in the context of managed 
care would have little impact on mental health spending and would increase risk protection.”); 
M. Audrey Burnam & José J. Escarce, Equity in Managed Care for Mental Disorders: Benefit 
Parity Is Not Sufficient to Ensure Equity, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct, 1999, at 22, 26 (explaining 
how costs of mental health care rise only a small amount under managed care plans); Jacobi, 
supra note 64, at 194 (attributing the reduction in price of mental health parity to adoption of 
MBHC methods); Samuel H. Zuvekas et al., The Impacts of Mental Health Parity and 
Managed Care in One Large Employer Group, HEALTH AFF., May-June, 2002, at 148, 152, 
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services were covered by MBHCs, and these companies covered nearly 
eighty percent of all privately insured persons.175  This substantial coverage 
has resulted in an equally substantial effect on costs.176  According to a 
2001 Report to the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration, large organizations that already used MBHCs saw minimal 
cost increases as a result of parity implementation, and those that switched 
to MBHCs during parity implementation experienced thirty to fifty percent 
reductions in total mental health costs.177  The fear, however, is that while 
helping end the cost debate, managed care may threaten the fundamental 
goal of parity: the creation of true equity between mental and physical 
illness in access to care.178  The arguments for and against managed care in 
general, and with regard to mental healthcare specifically, are too detailed 
to discuss here.  However, it is arguably valid to suggest that before full 
attention is turned to the issues of the managed care system with regard to 
mental health equity, mandated coverage of mental illness and true parity in 
benefit design should be fully addressed.  While the MHPAEA has been 
praised for creating full parity, the legislation retains certain loopholes, thus 
risking continued discrimination in benefit design itself.179 
Today there is little question that parity can be affordable.  Several states 
have demonstrated just this and, in some instances, have also shown that 
access to mental healthcare has increased through parity.  A 2003 study 
showed that Vermont’s sweeping mental health and substance abuse parity 
law, implemented in 1998, resulted in an eight to eighteen percent 
 
154 (finding that mental health costs dropped under managed care, while treatment 
prevalence and out-patient use increased). 
 175. Steven Findlay, Managed Behavioral Health Care in 1999: An Industry at a 
Crossroads, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 116, 116. 
 176. See Jacobi, supra note 64, at 194 (citing Findlay, supra note 175, at 117). 
 177. See KRISTEN REASONER APGAR, WASH. BUS. GRP. ON HEALTH, LARGE EMPLOYER PRACTICES 
IN BEHAVIORAL HEALTH BENEFIT DESIGN, SUBSTANCE ABUSE BENEFITS, AND THE USE OF CARVE-
OUTS—THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PARITY 6 (2001), available at http://www.businessgroup 
health.org/pdfs/final_report.pdf (citing MERRILE SING ET AL., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
INSURANCE BENEFITS: THE COSTS AND EFFECTS OF PARITY FOR MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE 
ABUSE INSURANCE BENEFITS 14 (1998); William Goldman et al., Costs and Use of Mental 
Health Services Before and After Managed Care, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 40, 40). 
 178. See Jacobi, supra note 64, at 196; see also Burnam, supra note 174, at 27 
(discussing the shift from the “demand-side cost containment strategies” of benefit design 
features in fee-for-service plans to the “supply-side cost-control strategies” of managed care, 
where utilization management and medical necessity definitions determine who receives 
benefits); Roland Sturm & Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, State Mental Health Parity Laws: Cause or 
Consequence of Differences in Use?, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 182, 191 (discussing 
the persistence of lower utilization of mental health services even after state parity laws are 
passed, and suggesting that parity legislation has not created a statistically significant increase 
in mental health and substance abuse disorder utilization). 
 179. See infra Part IV for discussion on MHPAEA’s positive and negative attributes. 
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decrease in mental health and substance abuse spending and an eighteen 
to twenty-four percent increase in access to mental health care.180  
Maryland began the transition to parity for mental illness and substance 
abuse disorders in 1994, with a managed care system already in place.181  
During the year of transition to parity, the cost for treatment of mental and 
addictive disorders rose by 0.84% of overall benefit costs; during the second 
year of parity, costs for these treatments remained level; and, in the third 
year of parity, costs for such treatments fell by 0.27%.182  In implementing its 
mental health parity statute for state employees only, Texas saw more than a 
fifty percent reduction in mental health care costs over the first five years of 
parity, a significant enough decrease for the state to introduce legislation 
creating parity for all residents.183  Other states have seen similar outcomes 
as a result of mental health and substance abuse disorder parity 
implementation.184 
 
 180. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., EFFECTS OF THE VERMONT MENTAL HEALTH AND 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE PARITY LAW 57-58 (2003) [hereinafter VERMONT PARITY STUDY], available at 
http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/PDFs/vtparity.pdf. 
 181. See HAROLD E. VARMUS, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PARITY IN FINANCING 
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES: MANAGED CARE EFFECTS ON COST, ACCESS AND QUALITY: AN INTERIM 
REPORT TO CONGRESS BY THE NATIONAL ADVISORY MENTAL HEALTH COUNCIL 10 (1998), 
available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/advisory-boards-and-groups/namhc/reports/ 
nimh-parity-report.pdf. 
 182. Id. at 11. 
 183. Id. at 10 (discussing the Texas program and the effect of a new managed care system 
on the cost of parity). 
 184. See generally Roland Sturm et al., Mental Health and Substance Abuse Parity: A Case 
Study of Ohio’s State Employee Program, 1 J. MENTAL HEALTH POL’Y & ECON., 129, 129 
(1998).  In Ohio, a state employee parity program was instituted in 1991 and expanded in 
1993 and 1997.  Id. at 131-32 tbl. 3.  A study of that state’s parity program showed that 
mental health and substance abuse disorder costs fell following full implementation in the two 
years of expansion.  Id. at 132.  Ten years after implementation, there was “no evidence of a 
cost explosion”; in fact, mental health and substance abuse costs had remained level.  
ROLAND STURM, RAND: THE COSTS OF COVERING MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE CARE AT 
THE SAME LEVEL AS MEDICAL CARE IN PRIVATE INSURANCE PLANS 3 (2001), available at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2005/CT180.pdf.  A study of California’s parity 
implementation showed similar outcomes.  See Ronald Branstrom & Roland Sturm, An Early 
Case Study of the Effects of California’s Mental Health Parity Legislation, 53 PSYCHIATRIC 
SERVICES 1215, 1215 (2002).  The 2001 study reviewed the effect of parity on two large 
employer groups, one with higher than average utilization rates before and after parity 
(Employer A), and one with lower utilization rates prior to parity but seeing a substantial 
increase in utilization post-parity (Employer B).  Id. at 1215-16.  Employer A witnessed both a 
decline in mental healthcare spending (-1.9%) and large reductions in outpatient, 
intermediate-care, and impatient service utilization.  Id. at 1216.  Employer B, while 
experiencing substantial increases in utilization and spending, saw an overall mental 
healthcare spending increase of less than one percent of total healthcare spending, an 
amount equal to $12 per member, per year.  Id. 
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However, direct healthcare expenditures are not the only costs that parity 
advocates suggest support their argument.  Rather, proponents argue that 
the failure to treat mental illness adequately creates substantial direct and 
indirect costs to society that outweigh any potential increase in cost caused 
by implementing parity.185  When the 1999 Surgeon General’s Report on 
mental health was issued, it found that mental illness was the second-
greatest burden of disease in countries with established market 
economies.186  The burden of disease classification was measured by what 
the World Health Organization (“WHO”) termed “disability-adjusted life 
years,” essentially the number of years of life lost due to poor health or 
premature death.187 
In 2004, the WHO updated their burden of disease study and the 
statistics had changed.188  Globally, unipolar depressive disorder is now the 
third leading cause of burden of disease.189  In middle- and high-income 
countries, this disorder is the number one cause of burden of disease.190  
Similarly disheartening, alcohol use disorders are the eighth and fifth 
leading cause of disease burden in middle- and high-income countries 
respectively.191  The WHO study shows that globally, and especially in 
upper-income countries, a highly treatable mental disorder and an oft-
related substance abuse disorder constitute two of the leading causes of 
years of life lost to premature death and less than full health.192 
According to the Surgeon General Report, the direct cost of treating 
mental illness was $69 billion in 1996, the year the MHPA was enacted.193  
In the twelve years since passage of the MHPA, medical inflation has 
 
 185. See Kennedy, supra note 12, at 370 (“[I]t is safe to estimate that mental illnesses cost 
the United States at least $200 billion per year.”). 
 186. SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 4. 
 187. Id.  The “disability-adjusted life year” is a measure used “to quantify the burden of 
diseases, injuries, and risk factors . . . based on years of life lost due to premature death and 
years of life lived in less than full health . . . .” WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE GLOBAL BURDEN OF 
DISEASE: 2004 UPDATE 2 (2008) [hereinafter 2004 GLOBAL BURDEN OF DISEASE STUDY]. 
 188. See 2004 GLOBAL BURDEN OF DISEASE STUDY, supra note 187, at 3. 
 189. Id. at 43. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 44 tbl. 13. 
 192. Id. at 42, 44 tbl. 3 (Unipolar major depressive disorder is the number one cause of 
lost years of life, and alcohol abuse is the number four cause, in upper-income countries; 
globally, major depressive disorder is the number three cause and alcohol abuse is in the top 
twenty.). 
 193. SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 20; see Carolyn M. Levinson & 
Benjamin G. Druss, The Evolution of Mental Health Parity in American Politics, 28 ADMIN. & 
POL’Y MENTAL HEALTH 139, 142 (stating that mental health parity was an amendment to the 
VA/HUD bill and signed into law in 1996). 
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created a nearly sixty percent increase in overall healthcare costs.194  Thus, 
assuming mental health costs have kept pace with general medical inflation, 
a sixty percent increase would currently place direct mental healthcare 
expenditures at about $110 billion.  Indirect costs are considered to be even 
more staggering.  Mental illness results in lost productivity in the 
workplace,195 increased disability costs due to mental health needs going 
untreated,196 increased unemployment,197 and, ironically, an increase in 
overall health care costs.198  Unlike other health disorders, the indirect 
expenses of undertreated and untreated mental illness are believed to 
outweigh their direct costs; a 1998 estimate placed indirect mental health 
care costs at $113 billion.199 
Clearly the indirect costs of mental healthcare are substantial.  Curbing 
these costs alone by effectively and efficiently treating mental illness would 
likely be sufficient to justify any potential increase in overall health insurance 
 
 194. Id. 
 195. Ronald C. Kessler et al., Prevalence and Effects of Mood Disorders on Work 
Performance in a Nationally Representative Sample of U.S. Workers, 163 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
1561, 1564 (2006).  This study found that persons suffering bipolar disorder lost the 
equivalent to 65.5 workdays per year and persons with major depressive disorder lost the 
equivalent to 27.2 workdays per year due to their illness.  Absenteeism—failing to report to 
work— accounted for 27.7 lost workdays per year among bipolar disorder sufferers and 8.7 
lost workdays per year among those suffering major depressive disorder.  Id. at 1563 tbl. 2.  
However, more lost productivity is created by presenteeism—where employees report to work 
but perform inefficiently.  Id.  Presenteeism accounts for 35.3 days of lost work production and 
18.2 days of lost work production among those with bipolar disorder and major depressive 
disorder, respectively.  Id. at 1562-63 tbl. 2.  That presenteeism accounts for much more lost 
productivity than absenteeism results in the fact that productivity loss is essentially invisible to 
employers.  Walter F. Stewart et al., Cost of Lost Productive Work Time Among U.S. Workers 
with Depression, 289 JAMA 3135, 3142-43 (2003).  The Kessler study estimates that a total 
loss of 96.2 million workdays among the United States civilian workforce, accounting for a 
total projected salary-equivalent loss of $50.7 billion per year.  Id. at 1564. 
 196. Mary Jane England, Capturing Mental Health Cost Offsets, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 
1999, at 91, 92 (“[D]epression often has the longest average length of disability and the 
highest probability of a second disability leave within one year.”). 
 197. Richard W. Goldberg et al., Correlates of Long-Term Unemployment Among Inner-
City Adults with Serious and Persistent Mental Illness, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 101, 101 
(2001) (stating that unemployment rates are typically higher than eighty-five percent among 
persons with severe psychiatric disorders). 
 198. Sandra Davidson et al., Cardiovascular Risk Factors for People with Mental Illness, 35 
AUSTL. & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 196, 199 (2001) (reporting that persons with mental illness are 
more likely 1) to be smokers, 2) to be overweight or obese, 3) to not exercise and, 4) to drink 
at harmful levels; as a result, individuals who suffer from mental illness have a higher mortality 
rate due to cardiovascular disease). 
 199. Dorothy P. Rice & Leonard S. Miller, Health Economics and Cost Implications of 
Anxiety and Other Mental Disorders in the United States, 173 (Supp. 34) BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 4, 
4-9 (1998). 
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costs created by parity.  These expenditures often appear to be overlooked 
in the cost debate, likely due to the fact that direct costs are much easier to 
calculate.  But even though some on both sides of the debate have long 
presumed an increase in healthcare costs, it does not appear clear that the 
direct costs of treating mental illness will necessarily result in higher overall 
costs to businesses and insurance providers upon implementation of full 
parity.  The advent of managed care has proven to be an effective means to 
control direct mental healthcare costs.  Whether that control results in truly 
equitable care is yet to be seen; however, as the main argument to date 
against mental health parity has been prohibitive costs, relevant research 
shows this is no longer a truly viable objection.  Clearly, untreated and 
undertreated mental illness is costly to society.  Both the direct and indirect 
costs of mental illness are staggering, likely topping $200 billion per 
year.200  The next section will discuss the paths some states have taken, both 
before and after passage of the MHPA, to control these costs and create 
parity for those suffering mental illness.  It is arguable that many states, even 
prior to passage of the MHPA, created parity laws that rival or surpass that 
created by the MHPAEA.  The question is whether those laws can be 
effective. 
III.  STATE LAWS REGULATING MENTAL HEALTH PARITY 
When the MHPAEA was signed into law on October 3, 2008, the Act 
was praised for its potential effect on eighty-two million Americans enrolled 
in self-funded group insurance plans and its prospective application to over 
113 million Americans’ health care coverage.201  The raw numbers are 
impressive.  But even prior to the passage of the 1996 MHPA, several states 
saw that parity was required and had taken the initiative to enact mental 
health parity statutes;202 following passage of the 1996 Act, states began to 
pass new parity laws in earnest.203  By the time the 110th Congress passed 
the MHPAEA, nearly every state had enacted some form of mental health 
parity law.204 
 
 200. Kennedy, supra note 12, at 370. 
 201. Parity at Last: Mental Health, Physical Health Get Equal Coverage, AMEDNEWS.COM, 
Nov. 10, 2008, http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2008/11/10/edsa1110.htm. 
 202. Kjorstad, supra note 73, at 37. 
 203. See Sturm & Pacula, supra note 178, at 185 (Between 1997 and 1998, parity 
legislation passed in Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Indiana, Missouri, South Carolina, Texas, 
Vermont, Delaware, Georgia, South Dakota, and Tennessee.). 
 204. See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, State Laws Mandating or Regulating 
Mental Health Benefits, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/mentalben.htm (last visited Sept. 
11, 2010) (noting that forty-six states currently have some form of parity legislation, and 
dividing that legislation into three categories—laws requiring “parity” for mental health 
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The state parity laws passed before and after the MHPA run the gamut.  
Some states passed laws that were essentially carbon copies of the federal 
MHPA, requiring nothing more of their insurance providers than that which 
was required by the federal law.205  Other states passed laws that required 
more parity in terms of benefits offered, parity on par with that required by 
the MHPAEA.206  Still other states required mental health parity above and 
beyond that required by the 2008 Act.207  However, while many state 
legislatures appeared to see the weaknesses of the MHPA and its failure to 
achieve anything resembling true parity, restrictions on these laws, created 
mainly due to the application of ERISA, prevented state parity laws from 
having their intended effects. 
A. State Mental Health Parity Laws in Advance of the MHPA 
Advocates of mental health began lobbying for increased coverage for 
those suffering mental illness as early as the 1950s.208  More than three 
decades later—thanks to political pressure from various mental health 
organizations coupled with the advent of more effective treatments, findings 
of biological causes for many serious mental illnesses, and more efficient 
cost control mechanisms created through managed health care—the 1990s 
brought about the first legitimate attempts at mental health law reform.209  
Beginning in 1991, the final decade of the 20th century saw no fewer than 
thirty-three states and the District of Columbia, as well as the federal 
government, pass varying decrees of mental health parity legislation.210  The 
trend toward parity continued in the 21st century as more and more states 
sought to create a nondiscriminatory landscape for those suffering mental 
illness.  By the passage of the MHPAEA in 2008, all but a small handful of 
states had passed some form of mental health parity legislation.211 
Prior to the passage of the MHPA in 1996, five states had enacted some 
form of mental health parity legislation.212  Texas and North Carolina were 
the first states in the union to pass parity statutes, enacting legislation five 
years prior to the MHPA, in 1991.213  Two years later, Massachusetts 
 
benefits; laws mandating minimum mental health benefit; and, laws mandating the offering of 
mental health benefits). 
 205. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 21.54.151 (2006). 
 206. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-661 (LexisNexis 2000). 
 207. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38a-488a(a), 38a-514(a) (West 2007). 
 208. Sturm & Pacula, supra note 178, at 183. 
 209. Id. at 182-83,184. 
 210. 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 47, at 8. 
 211. Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 204 (reporting that as of December 
2008, at least 46 states had passed parity legislation). 
 212. Kjorstad, supra note 73, at 37. 
 213. Id. at 38 chart 1. 
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became the third state to pass parity legislation.214  While clearly these states 
were ahead of every other state, as well as the federal government, in terms 
of seeking equality for mental illness, the laws enacted did little for the 
overall population of individuals who suffer from these diseases for one 
main reason: the first three parity laws only applied to state employees.215  
The first individuals in this country to receive some level of parity were state 
employees.  Similarly, many would argue that the first individuals to receive 
the benefits of meaningful parity legislation on a federal level were federal 
employees.216 
While the 1991 Texas statute and the 1993 Massachusetts statute only 
applied to state employees, both laws were implemented as a pilot program 
for state employees.217  Both states have subsequently expanded the 
coverage of the law to regulate private health care plans as well.218  
Between 1994 and the passage of the MHPA in 1996, Maine, Maryland, 
Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island passed mental health parity 
legislation that applied to all state-regulated insurance providers.  Each of 
these state laws was more comprehensive than the federal law enacted in 
1996. 
In June 2000, the National Institute of Mental Health’s National 
Advisory Mental Health Council (NAMHC) issued its final report to Congress 
on the issue of parity in mental health insurance.219  In that report, the 
NAMHC reviewed the effects of parity legislation with regard to a variety of 
subtopics.  Included in the report was information on state parity legislation 
enacted both prior to and after the passage of the 1996 MHPA.220  
Subsequent research focused specifically on parity legislation enacted prior 
to the MHPA.221  The NAMHC report classified variations in state law with 
regard to six issues: 1) categories of mental health mandates; 2) how the 
legislation defined mental illness; 3) whether the laws mandated coverage 
of chemical dependency; 4) whether the laws required insurers to provide 
the same terms and conditions for mental and physical illnesses; 5) whether 
the law exempted small employers; 6) whether the law contained cost 
increase exemptions.222 
 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 37. 
 216. See infra Part IV.B for discussion of the FEHB. 
 217. See Kjorstad, supra note 73, at 37. 
 218. See id. 
 219. See NAMHC REPORT, supra note 164, at 3. 
 220. See generally id. at 8-9. 
 221. See e.g., Kjorstad, supra note 73, at 37. 
 222. NAMHC REPORT, supra note 164, at 41 tbl. II; see also Kjorstad, supra note 73, at 
37. 
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The six categories set forth by the NAMHC are helpful in distinguishing 
between state laws and the federal law.  As will be shown, the 1996 MHPA 
was much less comprehensive than any of the state laws enacted prior to its 
passage.  With regard to the first category—types of mental health parity 
mandates—the NAMHC divided parity mandates into three areas: 
“mandatory inclusion” benefits; “mandated benefit offerings”; and, 
“mandated if offered” benefits.223  Mandated if offered legislation, that 
which requires complicity with parity provisions only if the insurer provides 
mental health coverage, is what the MHPA and the MHPAEA created, and is 
the least restrictive form of mandated benefits offering.224  Four out of the 
five states that passed comprehensive parity legislation prior to passage of 
the MHPA required mental health benefit mandates surpassing those in the 
1996 Act.225  Only the fifth, Minnesota, enacted a benefits mandate similar 
to that passed in the MHPA, although it also covered substance abuse.226 
Minnesota’s parity legislation, passed in 1995, mandates mental health 
coverage for HMOs, but only requires parity if mental health coverage is 
offered in individual and group plans.227  Three of the other four states that 
enacted parity legislation prior to the MHPA—Maryland, New Hampshire, 
and Rhode Island—mandated coverage of mental health benefits no less 
restrictive than those benefits offered for physical health.228  The fourth 
state—Maine—mandated coverage of mental health benefits in group 
insurance plans, and mandated the offering of equitable mental health 
coverage in individual plans.229  Thus, in at least some respects, all five 
states that passed parity legislation prior to enactment of the MHPA required 
insurance carriers to provide mental health coverage, something the MHPA 
failed to do.  As will be discussed further below, this requirement has not 
had a great effect on those suffering from mental illness, mainly due to 
federal restrictions in applicability of state law in this area.230  The MHPAEA 
of 2008 does not extend the scope of the MHPA in this very important 
respect, and fails to mandate mental health coverage by insurers. 
 
 223. NAMHC REPORT, supra note 164, at 43. 
 224. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(b)(1) (2006) (defining “mandated if offered” 
legislation). 
 225. See NAMHC REPORT, supra note 159, at 8, 41-42 tbl. II (comparing state mental 
health parity statutes). 
 226. Id. 
 227. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62Q.47 (West 1995). 
 228. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19-703.1(b) (LexisNexis 2005); MD. CODE 
ANN., INS. § 490V (1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 414:18-a (1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-
18.6-2 (2002); see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-18.6-4 (2002). 
 229. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2325-A (2000). 
 230. See generally infra footnote 249 and accompanying text. 
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The second category the NAMHC used to distinguish state parity statutes 
was the definition of mental illness in state legislation.231  Specifically, the 
NAMHC distinguished between state statutes that provide parity for a broad 
category of mental illness versus state statutes that provide parity only for 
“serious mental illness[es].”232  Opponents of parity legislation have often 
decried the notion of requiring insurers to offer coverage parity for mental 
illnesses as defined in nationally and internationally recognized objective 
authorities, such as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders.233  If parity is required at all, these opponents would suggest that 
the definition of mental illness be limited to a defined set of severe mental 
illnesses, or left to the coverage provider to determine on a medical 
 
 231. NAMHC REPORT, supra note 164, at 8, 42 tbl. II.  The NAMHC Report divides states’ 
parity legislation into two classes—those that provide “broad-based mental illness coverage” 
and those that limit coverage parity to “serious mental illness[es].”  Id. at 8.  “‘Broad-based 
mental illness coverage’ [is] defined to include all mental disorders listed in the American 
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (4th edition) and/or the mental 
disorders in the World Health Organization’s International Classification of Diseases.  Id. at 8, 
n.6.  Some States allow health plans to define the scope of the mental health benefit.  Id. at 
40 tbl. ID.  Several States narrow the scope of the statute by requiring coverage for ‘serious 
mental illness,’ most commonly defined as including schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, major depressive disorder, panic disorder, schizo-affective 
disorder, and delusional disorder.  Id. at 38 tbl. IB; Kjorstad, supra note 73, at 39.  See also 
id. at 37 (“[M]many states utilize the biologically based definition of mental illness, as it is 
more widely accepted by insurance companies and politicians.”). 
 232. NAMHC REPORT, supra note 164, at 8.  The broad-based definition statutes, 
however, included laws that left open the determination of coverage to providers, as well as 
laws that mandated coverage for all mental illnesses as defined in an objective manual.  See 
id. at 37 tbl. IA.  Thus, the MHPA is described as a “broad-based” legislation, but the Act did 
not require insurance providers to rely on an objective manual, and instead left mental illness 
determinations up to the provider.  Marcia C. Peck & Richard M. Scheffler, An Analysis of the 
Definitions of Mental Illness Used in State Parity Laws, 53 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1089, 1091 
(2002).  It has been noted, however, that when the term “mental illness” has been used in 
federal legislation, it traditionally has been interpreted to include all disorders in the American 
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.  Id. at 1090.  
It is clear from the application of the MHPA, and the language and understanding of the 
MHPAEA, that the federal parity legislation is designed to leave the definition of mental illness, 
for coverage purposes, to the insurers. 
 233. See 154 CONG. REC. H1285 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 2008) (statement of Rep. Deal) 
(Representative Nathan Deal argued that including coverage of all illnesses in the DSM would 
mean that insurers were required to provide coverage for things such as caffeine addiction 
and jet lag.). 
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necessity basis.234  The MHPAEA has granted the wish of the opposition, as 
did its predecessor.235 
Since passage of the MHPA, many state legislatures have taken it upon 
themselves to define more expansively the term mental illness.  However, of 
the five states with parity legislation in effect prior to the MHPA, it is not clear 
that any had a truly broad-based definition of mental illness.  The Maryland 
statute is interpreted as a broad-based statute, although it does not specify 
criteria based on an objective mental health manual.236  The NAMHC 
Report refers to Minnesota’s parity legislation as a broad-based definitional 
statute.237  However, a 2002 study shows that Minnesota in fact leaves the 
definition of mental illness to individual health plans.238  Unlike the NAMHC 
Report, the researchers for the 2002 study would not classify as “broad-
based” a statute that leaves the definition to the provider.239 
According to the 2002 study, New Hampshire and Rhode Island are the 
only two pre-MHPA parity states that currently boast legislation with broad-
based definitions of mental illness.240  However, in 1994 when the states’ 
original parity laws were passed, New Hampshire employed a biologically 
 
 234. See 154 CONG. REC. H1285 (Representative Deal argues that federal legislation 
should be focused on serious biologically based mental disorders.). 
 235. See Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity Addiction Equity Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 512(a)(4), 122 Stat. 3881, 3884 (defining “mental health 
benefits” as: “benefits with respect to services for mental health conditions, as defined under 
the terms of the plan and in accordance with applicable Federal and State law.”).  The 
MHPEAE definition replaced the description in the MHPA, which defined “mental health 
benefits” as: “benefits with respect to mental health services, as defined under the terms of the 
plan or coverage [].”  Pub. L. No. 104-204, § 712(e)(4), 110 Stat. 2945, 2947.  Thus, the 
MHPA definition explicitly excluded benefits for treatment of substance abuse or chemical 
dependency. 
 236. Peck and Scheffler, supra note 232, at 1091 n. c.  Maryland’s parity statute covers 
“mental illness and emotional disorders.”  Id. 
 237. NAMHC REPORT, supra note 164, at 41 tbl. II. 
 238. Peck and Scheffler, supra note 232, at 1090. 
 239. See id. at 1090 (Minnesota, Indiana, and New Mexico were not included in the 
analysis because these states leave the definition of mental illness to the individual health 
plan.).  The NAMHC Report referred to the MHPA definition of mental illness as “broad” as 
well, even though it allows plans to define mental illness. Pub. L. No. 104-204, § 712(e)(4), 
110 Stat. 2947 (1996); NAMHC REPORT, supra note 164, at 41. 
 240. Peck and Scheffler, supra note 232, at 1091.  New Hampshire passed a 2002 
amendment to expand coverage to all mental disorders in the DSM (except chemical 
dependence), and Rhode Island passed a 2001 bill that included all disorders in the DSM and 
ICD (except mental retardation, learning disorders, motor skills disorders, and communication 
disorders).  Id. n. d & f. 
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based definition of mental illness,241 and Rhode Island provided a “serious 
mental illness” definition.242  Maine’s pre-1996 legislation has been 
interpreted by lawmakers to provide a “serious mental illness” definition, 
although the statute fails to use that term.243  While three of the states with 
pre-1996 laws were said to have “restricted” the definition of mental illness, 
and thus also the level of required coverage of mental illness, it must be 
remembered that each of these states mandated coverage of benefits for 
these illnesses, where the MHPA (and the MHPAEA) mandate no coverage 
whatsoever. 
The third distinguishing category used in the NAMHC Report was 
coverage of substance abuse.  One of the most important features of the 
MHPAEA is its inclusion of parity in coverage for substance use disorder 
benefits, notably absent from the 1996 legislation.244  While the importance 
of this addition to the new federal law will be discussed in more detail 
below, for purposes of this Section it is important to note that two of the five 
states with pre-1996 parity legislation included coverage of chemical 
dependency in their original statutes: Maryland and Minnesota.245  Only 
New Hampshire failed to add substance abuse disorders to its parity statute 
prior to enactment of the MHPAEA.246  These state legislatures were aware 
that creating parity for mental illness benefits could not be truly beneficial 
without including parity language for chemical dependency.  It is now widely 
believed that as many as fifty percent of the mentally ill population also 
suffers from chemical dependency.247  Thus, it is imperative that substance 
abuse disorders be afforded the same level of protection as mental illnesses. 
The fourth category the NAMHC Report used to distinguish state parity 
laws was whether the law required parity in terms and conditions of 
insurance contracts.248  One of the aspects of the MHPA that incensed 
mental health advocates, and caused the law to have little or no effect on 
 
 241. Id. at n. d (defining mental illness to include “schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, 
bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, paranoid and 
psychotic disorders, panic disorders, and autism”). 
 242. Id. at n. f (defining “serious mental illness” as “schizophrenia and schizoaffective, 
bipolar, major depressive, obsessive-compulsive, and delusional disorders”). 
 243. Id. at 1092 tbl. 2, n. f (covering schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, major depressive 
disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, panic disorder, autism, paranoia, and psychosis). 
 244. See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
 245. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 19-703.1, 8-101 (LexisNexis 2005); MINN. 
STAT. § 62Q.47 (2009). 
 246. H. 762, Ch. 204. 
 247. NAMI Dual Diagnosis Report, supra note 98 (finding the drug most commonly 
abused to be alcohol, followed by marijuana and cocaine, and noting that prescription drugs 
are also abused). 
 248. NAMHC REPORT, supra note 222, at 41, tbl. II. 
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achieving true parity, was that the law only applied to annual and lifetime 
benefits.  As was expected, insurance companies began placing more and 
more restrictions on the terms and conditions of contracts, essentially 
making mental health benefits even less comparable to physical benefits 
than they had been prior to the MHPA.249  Again, it was not until passage of 
the MHPAEA that Congress corrected this gaping loophole.250  But as with 
many of the other shortcomings of the MHPA, the states that enacted earlier 
legislation again demonstrated forethought.  All five pre-1996 parity states 
enacted laws with stricter parity requirements than the MHPA with regard to 
the terms and conditions of insurance contracts.251 
The final two categories used to distinguish parity laws in the NAMHC 
Report were exemption categories: small employer exemptions and cost 
exemptions.252  Both types of exemptions existed in the MHPA, and both 
were reintroduced in the MHPAEA.  The cost exemption is critically low in 
the MHPAEA,253 and many states have provided either no cost exemption or 
a cost exemption higher than that allowed by the federal statute.  Moreover, 
the small employer exemption has often been charged as one of the key 
reasons for lack of access for many mental illness sufferers.  Prior to 
enactment of the 1996 Act, only one of the five states with parity legislation 
– Rhode Island – had a cost exemption provision.254  Rhode Island also had 
a small employer exemption; Maine was the only other state with a small 
employer exemption.255  The fact that many states have not provided a small 
business exception is extremely important, especially since the MHPAEA 
reapplies the small business exception of the 1996 Act.  Because ERISA 
preempts more restrictive state statutes with regard to self-funded employer 
insurance, state statutes without small business exemptions are able to assist 
more citizens in achieving true parity.256 
 
 249. 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 47, at 5 (finding that as of 1999, of the insurers in 
compliance with the MHPA, 87% had instituted additional restrictions on coverage resulting in 
fewer mental health benefits being covered than physical benefits). 
 250. See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
 251. NAMHC REPORT, supra note 164, at 8.  See also id. at 41 tbl. II. 
 252. Id. at 44.  Small employer exemptions typically provide that employers with less than 
25 or 50 employees do not have to abide by the parity rules; cost exemption statutes provide 
an exemption from parity requirements if an insurers costs rise due to implementation of parity.  
Id. 
 253. See discussion of the MHPAEA cost exemption infra Section IV.B. 
 254. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-3 (1994). 
 255. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2325-A (1995).  However, Maine’s small employer 
exemption only applied to businesses with twenty or fewer employees, rather than the federal 
statutes exemption for businesses with fifty or fewer employees.  § 2325-A. 
 256. Janet L. Kaminski, Self-Insured Benefit Plans and Insurance Mandates, OLR RESEARCH 
REPORT (2005), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/rpt/2005-R-0753.htm.  Most small 
businesses cannot afford to be self-insured, and thus do not fall within the purview of ERISA; 
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While a handful of states had considered and even passed mental 
illness and substance abuse parity legislation prior to passage of the MHPA, 
once the federal legislature cracked the door to mental health parity the 
floodgates opened.  During the twelve years between passage of the MHPA 
and the MHPAEA, nearly every state passed some form of parity legislation, 
some more meaningful than others.  It is questionable, though, whether 
even the more comprehensive state laws were capable of creating equitable 
treatment for mental illness, mainly due to ERISA preemption. 
B. The MHPA Sparks a Rapid Increase in State Parity Legislation, but Can It 
Be Effective? 
When Congress passed the MHPA in 1996, only five states had passed 
mental health parity legislation.257  However, as the previous section 
discusses, each of these early parity laws was more comprehensive than the 
federal law enacted by the MHPA.  During the twelve years between 
passage of the MHPA and the MHPAEA, forty-one additional states passed 
mental health parity laws.258  The number of individual pieces of parity 
legislation was certainly much higher, considering that in 2001 alone, 
seventy-six separate pieces of parity legislation were considered by thirty-four 
states.259 
From 1997 through 2000, approximately the period of time the MHPA 
was intended to last prior to sunset, thirty-four separate states enacted parity 
legislation.260  According to the 2000 GAO Report, fourteen states and the 
District of Columbia passed parity laws in the year immediately following 
passage of the MHPA.261  The following year, 1998, eight additional states 
passed parity laws, and Kansas and West Virginia amended their 1997 
legislation.262  In 1999, three new states – Hawaii, New Jersey, and 
 
however, because many large companies are self-insured, ERISA preempts state laws with 
respect to them.  Thus, state statutes do not apply to many large businesses, and if the state 
statute further exempts small businesses, it will affect very few companies at all.  Id. 
 257. See discussion infra Section III.A. 
 258. See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 204, at 4-17. 
 259. See Beth Mellen Harrison, Mental Health Parity, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 255, 261 n. 
56 (2002); see also Dana L. Kaplan, Can Legislation Alone Solve America’s Mental Health 
Dilemma? Current State Legislative Schemes Cannot Achieve Mental Health Parity,8 
QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J., 325, 344-45 (2005). 
 260. 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 47, at 41 tbl. 30. 
 261. Id.  In 1997 Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, 
Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia 
enacted parity laws.  Id. 
 262. Id. (adding Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, New Mexico, New York, South 
Dakota, and Vermont to the list of states with new parity legislation).  Of note, Vermont’s 
parity statute has generally been considered one of the most comprehensive parity statutes.  
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Pennsylvania – enacted parity legislation, and Delaware enacted new 
legislation.263  And in 2000, fourteen states implemented a new form of 
parity legislation, either creating new legislation or amending an existing 
law.264  Thus, by the end of 2000, thirty-nine states had enacted some form 
of parity.  Over the next eight years prior to Congress’s enactment of the 
MHPAEA, seventeen of the remaining twenty-one states enacted parity laws. 
With forty-six states enacting parity legislation between 1996 and 2008, 
one would expect the individual laws to be somewhat different.  This 
expectation proves correct, and this is one of the reasons why the federal 
government should enact parity legislation that encompasses the best of the 
state laws. In twelve years nearly every state has passed their own version of 
parity legislation, and while some states have strived to create the most 
comprehensive laws possible, other states have merely enacted laws that do 
little more than the MHPA.  Thus, as the MHPAEA goes into effect in 2010, 
these states are likely to do nothing.  Essentially, the states that have laws in 
place requiring their insurance industry to comply with the federal law need 
do nothing.  As previously stated, the state laws run the gamut: from laws 
requiring nothing more than what federal legislation requires,265 to the most 
comprehensive parity laws, mandating coverage of mental illness and 
requiring that coverage be equitable to coverage of medical and surgical 
benefits.266 
These differences in laws are not beneficial to anyone.  Which state a 
person lives in will determine if, and to what extent, his or her treatment for 
mental illness is covered.  In one state, a person participating in a group 
health plan might find that all treatments for any mental disorder are 
covered by their insurance plan, and in fact that coverage might be 
mandated by state law.267  In the neighboring state, however, that same 
person might find that not a single mental disorder is covered by their 
 
Margo Rosenbach, Mental Health and Substance Abuse Parity in Vermont: Employer 
Perspectives, ISSUE BRIEF, Sept. 2003, at 1, 1. 
 263. 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 47, at 44-54 tbl. 30. 
 264. Id. at 41-58 (listing the states with first-time legislation as: Alabama, California, 
Connecticut, Kentucky, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Virginia; and the states with 
amended legislation as: Indiana, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Mew Mexico, and 
Tennessee). 
 265. In fact, Wyoming and Wisconsin have no parity statutes whatsoever.  LARA GREGORIO, 
MENTAL HEALTH PARITY (2009), http://www.nationaleatingdisorders.org/uploads/file/EDparity 
anddescription(2).pdf.; see also Join Together, No Parity in New Wisconsin Health Plan, 
Critics Charge, JOINTOGETHER.ORG (2009), http://www.jointogether.org/news/headlines/inthe 
news/2009/no-parity-in-new-wisconsin.html. 
 266. Vermont, for example, not only mandates full parity, it mandates it for individual as 
well as group insurance providers.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4089b (2001). 
 267. See, e.g., §§ 4089b(b)-(c). 
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insurance plan, and nothing in the state law prohibits that total lack of 
coverage.  In fact, this latter scenario reflects how both the MHPA and 
MHPAEA treat the situation.268 
Even in different states whose statutes appear to mandate coverage of 
the same illnesses – all “severe” or “serious” mental illness – one will find 
that the legislatures have defined those terms in a different way.269  This 
“patchwork” of state laws makes it extremely difficult to determine accurately 
the effect of parity legislation on those suffering mental illness.  The fact is, 
Americans suffering from mental illness are not only receiving disparate 
treatment as compared to Americans suffering physical illnesses.  In many 
cases they are also receiving disparate treatment as compared to citizens 
suffering from mental illness in states whose legislatures have passed more 
comprehensive parity legislation.  For instance, as of 2002, nine state 
legislatures, like the federal Congress, provided for some type of cost 
increase exemption, no longer requiring their insurance companies to 
provide equitable mental health coverage upon showing a cost increase due 
to parity.270  Similarly, seventeen states in 2002 provided small employer 
exemptions in their state statutes, thereby authorizing certain employers to 
provide inequitable mental health coverage.271  Substance abuse disorders, 
discussed above as being linked to fifty percent of mental illnesses, 
remained excluded by nine of the forty-six states with parity legislation as of 
2008.272 
However, this legal patchwork is not the only downfall to leaving truly 
comprehensive parity legislation to the states.  State laws have been 
preempted from day one by ERISA.  Even prior to passage of the MHPA, 
 
 268. See discussion of the MHPA supra Section II.A.; see also discussion of the MHPAEA 
infra section IV. 
 269. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10144.5 (2005) (defining “severe” mental illness to 
include schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, major depressive disorders, 
panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, pervasive developmental disorder or autism, 
anorexia nervosa, and bulimia nervosa); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3343 (1999) (defining 
“serious” mental disorder to include schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, obsessive-compulsive 
disorder, major depressive disorder, panic disorder, anorexia nervosa, bulimia nervosa, schizo 
affective disorder and delusional disorder); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-22-706(6) (2007) 
(defining “severe” mental illness to include schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar 
disorder, major depression, panic disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder and autism); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5.4-7(10) (2006) (stating that “serious” mental illness includes 
“schizophrenia, bi-polar disorders as well as a spectrum of psychotic and other severely 
disabling psychiatric diagnostic categories, but does not include infirmities of aging or a 
primary diagnosis of mental retardation, alcohol, or drug abuse or anti-social behavior”). 
 270. See VERMONT PARITY STUDY, supra note 180, at ex. I.1 (noting that twenty-three states 
at the time of the study had no cost increase exemption). 
 271. Id. 
 272. Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 204, at 4-17. 
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ERISA limited the application of the early parity laws. ERISA preempts state 
law for all self-insured employer health insurance plans.  Thus, no matter 
how comprehensive a state law, its restrictions do not apply to these plans.  
According to a report by the Employee Benefit Research Institute (“EBRI”), as 
of 2000, fifty million workers and their dependents received benefits through 
employer sponsored self-insured group health plans, representing thirty-
three percent of the 150 million Americans in private, employment-based 
plans.273  In 2006, the number of workers in self-insured plans, and thus the 
number of Americans to whom comprehensive state parity laws did not 
apply, had increased dramatically to 73 million.274 
It appears that most states saw the passage of the MHPA in 1996 as a 
sign that mental health parity was affordable.  This sign led to the enactment 
of parity laws in forty-one states over the course of the next twelve years.  
However, the patchwork nature of the state legislation, the preemption of 
state insurance laws by the MHPA in terms of self-insured employer health 
plans, and the minimal benefits provided by the MHPA itself, assured that 
individuals suffering from mental illness would continue to receive 
inequitable treatment.  On October 3, 2008, as part of an economic 
bailout package aimed at rescuing the nation’s banking and mortgage 
systems, among others, the U.S. Congress passed the first piece of 
meaningful federal parity legislation in at least twelve years. 
IV.  THE MENTAL HEALTH PARITY AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT ACT OF 2008 
A. Twelve Years – The Differences Between the 1996 and 2008 Acts: How 
the MHPAEA Seeks to End Discrimination 
According to James Jordan, executive director of the National Alliance 
on Mental Illness, enactment of the MHPAEA ended almost twenty years of 
struggle and eliminated discriminatory practices by some insurance 
companies.275  This sentiment was echoed by one of the bill’s major 
sponsors, Senator Pete Domenici (R-N.M.), who argued that the new law 
ushers in a new era of mental healthcare.276  Still others trumpeted the 
 
 273. Self-Insurance Inst. of Am., Self-Insured Group Health Plans, http://www.siia.org/i4a/ 
pages/Index.cfm?pageID=4546 (last visited Sept. 11, 2010). 
 274. William Pierron & Paul Fronstin, ERISA Pre-emption: Implications for Health Reform 
and Coverage, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE ISSUE BRIEF, Feb. 2008, at 1, 11, 
available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_02a-20082.pdf. 
 275. Christopher Guadagnino, Historic Mental Health Parity Law Passes, PHYSICIAN’S NEWS 
DIGEST (2008), http://www.physiciansnews.com/spotlight/1108pa.html. 
 276. Amy Novotney, Landmark Victory: The New Mental Health Parity Law Dramatically 
Expands Coverage of Mental Health Treatment, MONITOR ON PSYCHOL., Nov. 2008, at 27, 
28, available at http://www.apa.org/monitor/2008/11/parity.html (quoting Senator Domenici 
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passage of the MHPAEA. Representative Patrick Kennedy, the main House 
sponsor, voiced his excitement about the bill’s passage.277  And American 
Psychological Association CEO Norman B. Anderson sees the passage of 
the MHPAEA as removing “a significant barrier to receiving effective 
treatments for mental and substance abuse disorders.”278 
This excitement likely sounds familiar to anyone who remembers the 
enthusiasm following the passage of the MHPA.  A notable bit of praise 
following that Act came from then Executive Director of the National 
Alliance on Mental Illness, Laurie Flynn: 
American families in communities large and small who are coping with the 
devastating effects of severe mental illnesses can breathe a little easier 
knowing their loved ones are covered by insurance.  This modest anti-
discrimination law eliminates the double standard held against millions 
suffering from brain disorders and gives them renewed hope for 
reestablishing full and productive lives.279 
Following passage of the MHPAEA, however, there appears to be much 
more to cheer about.  Clearly, the law is better than the original federal 
legislation, even if it does not live up to some of the most comprehensive 
state legislation or some of the prior versions of parity proposed in 
Congress.280  And it was twelve long years in the making. 
It is impossible to say whether the MHPAEA would have passed were it 
not for the economic meltdown America faced in late 2008,281 but the 
 
as saying, “No longer will we allow mental health to be treated as a stepchild in the health-
care system.”). 
 277. “Because of your hard work, the American dream will no longer be rationed by 
diagnosis.”  Id. at 29. 
 278. Id. at 28. 
 279. NAMI Press Release, supra note 105. 
 280. For example, in a version of H.R. 1424 debated on the floor of the House on March 
5, 2008, the following language would have been added to the MHPAEA: 
“MINIMUM SCOPE OF MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE-RELATED DISORDER 
BENEFITS.— 
In the case of a group health plan (or health insurance coverage offered in connection 
with such a plan) that provides any mental health or substance-related disorder 
benefits, the plan or coverage shall include benefits for any mental health condition or 
substance-related disorder included in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders published by the American Psychiatric 
Association.” 
154 CONG. REC. H1279 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 2008) (text of House Resolution 1424). 
The final version of the MHPAEA passed by the Senate again left the determination of which 
illnesses group plans will cover to the individual providers. 
 281. While it is uncertain whether the Senate would have ever taken up H.R. 1424 if the 
House had passed the original bailout package, it is clear that mental health parity was a 
major topic of discussion during the 110th Congress. On February 12th, 2007, the Senate 
introduced S. 558, the Mental Health Parity Act of 2007.  CRS REPORT, supra note 110, at 1.  
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economic crisis proved to be at least a factor in the passage of a new parity 
law.  With multiple banks and lending institutions being bought-out or on 
the brink of collapse, and still others requesting government money to bail 
them out of potential failure, discussion of an economic bailout package 
began in the early fall.  In late September, with the leaders of both the 
Democratic and Republican Parties warning of a global financial meltdown 
if a bailout of the financial industry was not passed, the House rejected a 
$700 billion bailout bill.282  The 2008 presidential and congressional 
elections were just over a month away, and political posturing was at its 
peak.  Although the House failed to pass its version of an economic bailout, 
almost six months earlier, on March 5, 2008, it had passed the MHPAEA.  
In what may have been simply a savvy political move,283 accompanied by a 
stroke of luck in favor of parity advocates, the Senate chose this House bill – 
H.R. 1424, originally introduced in March 2007 – to pass the economic 
bailout package.284 
In amending ERISA, the PHSA, and the Internal Revenue Code, the 
MHPAEA has responded to many, if not all, of the concerns created by the 
MHPA.  The two laws are markedly different.  While the MHPAEA, like its 
predecessor, required a one year wait prior to implementation,285 it has 
 
Two days later, the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee approved the 
legislation, and less than a month later the House introduced H.R. 1424, the Paul Wellstone 
Mental Health and Addiction Equity Act.  Id. at 11.  In May, the Senate also introduced a 
children’s version of the parity bill, the Children’s Mental Health Parity Act (S. 1337), which 
would have amended the Social Security Act to provide equal coverage of mental healthcare 
under the State Children’s Health Insurance Program.  Id. at 12. 
 282. Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, House Rejects Bailout Package, 228-205; Stocks 
Plunge, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/30/ 
business/30bailout.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=House%20Rejects%20Bailout%20Package,%202
28-205;%20Stocks%20Plunge&st=cse. 
 283. As the Constitution bars the Senate from initiating new spending bills, and the House 
had voted down the bailout package both parties’ leaders felt was necessary, the Senate 
needed to find a piece of legislation on which to attach the bailout package.  Nat’l Ass’n of 
Addiction Treatment Providers, The Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity 
and Addiction Equity Act of 2008: A Guide for Addiction Professionals and Treatment 
Providers, NAATP VISIONS, Nov. 2008, at1, 2, available at http://www.naatp.org/pdf/news 
letters/08novembersi.pdf.  The Senate used the H.R. 1424 – which had now been altered to 
reflect comprises between the two Houses of Congress – stripped the text of the original bill, 
and amended the bill to include the compromised version of parity legislation, the Senate’s 
version of the economic bailout package, and various tax cuts and credits.  Id. Thus, H.R. 
1424, the Paul Wellstone Mental Health and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, became the 169 
page Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.  Id.  The Act did contain twelve pages of 
parity.  Id. 
 284. Id. 
 285. See MHPAEA, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §§ 512(a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(1), 122 Stat. 3881-93 
(2008). 
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removed the sunset provision that existed in the MHPA.286  Thus, it will take 
an Act of Congress to remove the provisions of the MHPAEA, rather than 
requiring a legislative continuation of the sunset every year until future 
legislation is passed, as was the case under the MHPA.287  Congress’s 
decision to not include a sunset provision in the new Act shows that its 
members, including parity opponents, have truly accepted the need for 
meaningful parity legislation and realize that parity legislation is practical 
and affordable.  When the MHPA was passed, antagonism toward the 
measure was nearly as vociferous as the support.  Thus, providing a sunset 
for the legislation in the event that it proved dramatically cost prohibitive, as 
many opponents predicted, was one of the only means by which to pass the 
legislation.288  While not a major substantive change, removal of the sunset 
proves that parity, in some form or another, is here to stay. 
The MHPAEA has, however, created major substantive changes to 
federal parity law as well.  First and foremost, the MHPAEA finally has 
provided parity for the fifty percent of individuals suffering substance use 
disorder alongside their mental illness.289  The term “mental health benefits” 
has now been replaced by the much more inclusive “mental health and 
substance use disorder benefits.”290  As discussed, one of the original 
sponsors of mental health parity on the federal level, Senator Paul Wellstone 
of Minnesota, had a family member who fell within the category of 
individuals suffering both mental illness and corresponding substance use 
disorder.291  While Senator Wellstone did not live to see the passage of the 
MHPAEA and parity for substance use disorders,292 his advocacy for these 
illnesses surely contributed to the passage of the new Act.  The importance 
of the MHPAEA’s inclusion of substance use disorders cannot be overstated.  
Not only does the law provide for at least a partial end to discrimination 
 
 286. §§ 512(a)(5), (b)(5), (c)(5). 
 287. See e.g., supra note 127 (citing two Congressional acts that reauthorized the MHPA 
from 2003 to 2004 and from 2004 to 2005). 
 288. See supra section II (discussing opposition to the MHPA). 
 289. MHPAEA §§ 512(a)(4), (7), (8). 
 290. §§ 512(a)(7), (b)(7), (c)(7).  Like its predecessor, the MHPAEA’s treatment of 
substance use disorders mirrors its treatment of mental health benefits in that it leaves the 
definition of a substance use disorder up to the plan providers.  §§512 (a)(4), (b)(4),(c)(4). 
 291. Levinson & Druss, supra note 5, at 139. 
 292. Senator Wellstone died in a tragic plane crash while campaigning in 2002.  David E. 
Rosenbaum, A Death in the Senate: A Liberal Voice Stilled, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2002, at 
A19. 
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against this group, it offers coverage of a disorder that many state laws still 
fail to provide.293 
The most important changes implemented by the MHPAEA are changes 
to the initial subsections of Section 712 of ERISA,294 Section 2705 of the 
PHSA,295 and Section 9812 of the IRC.296  After the MHPA was enacted, 
these sections were changed to include provisions requiring that group 
health plans provide equitable coverage in terms of aggregate lifetime and 
annual limits.297  As discussed, these provisions left the door open for 
insurance providers to apply cost-containment measures to mental health 
benefits in virtually every aspect of their plans.  In sweeping language, the 
MHPAEA has corrected this flaw.298 
The MHPAEA now requires group health plans that offer mental health 
benefits to ensure that any financial requirements in the plan that are 
applicable to mental health or substance use disorders are “no more 
restrictive than the predominant financial requirements applied to 
substantially all medical and surgical benefits covered by the planFalse”299  
Furthermore, plans can no longer impose cost sharing requirements on 
individuals suffering mental health or substance use disorders, if those cost 
sharing requirements are not imposed on all individuals in the plan.300 
Restrictive treatment limitations are also proscribed.  Specifically, group 
health plans can no longer apply more restrictive treatment limitations to 
mental health and substance use benefits than “the predominant treatment 
limitations applied to substantially all medical and surgical benefits;” 
moreover, they cannot apply separate limitations applicable only to mental 
health and substance use benefits.301  To be clear, the Act defines financial 
 
 293. Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 204 (“[A]t least 38 states” provide 
coverage for alcohol, drugs, or substance abuse.  This suggests that as many as twelve states 
still fail to protect this population from discrimination.). 
 294. 29 U.S.C. §1185a (2000). 
 295. 42 U.S.C. §300gg-5 (2006). 
 296. 26 U.S.C. § 9812 (2006). 
 297. See supra section II (discussing the MHPA). 
 298. See MHPAEA, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §§ 512(a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(1), 122 Stat. 3881-89 
(2008). 
 299. §§ 512(a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(1).  It is important that each of the three amendments begins 
by discussing “financial requirements” in broad, generalized terms.  If the law had used 
restrictive language, such that it would potentially prohibit discrimination as to certain financial 
requirements but not others, insurance providers would almost certainly use those loopholes to 
continue providing inequitable coverage.  In fact, this is exactly what happened under the 
MHPA. 
 300. §§ 512(a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(1).  Each of the three amendments contains the language 
“there are no separate cost sharing requirements that are applicable only with respect to 
mental health or substance use disorder benefits.” 
 301. §§ 512(a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(1). 
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requirements to include deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, and out-of-
pocket expenses; it defines treatment limitation to include limits on the 
frequency of treatment, number of visits, and days of coverage.302  
Importantly, however, these lists are not exhaustive – rather, they simply list 
the more common methods by which insurers had practiced discrimination 
under the MHPA. 
Another method by which insurers had discriminated against the 
mentally ill was by limiting or eliminating out-of-network for mental illnesses 
and substance use disorders.  The MHPAEA corrects this flaw as well.303  No 
longer will insurance plans governed by ERISA or the PHSA be permitted to 
limit or disallow coverage for treatment provided by out-of-network 
providers to the mentally ill unless the same coverage is limited or 
disallowed for all members of the plan.304  These amendments to the law 
are why the MHPAEA has been heralded as an introduction of full parity.  
While the MHPA only applied to annual and lifetime limits on coverage, the 
new law expressly prohibits discrimination by means of any type of restrictive 
financial requirements or treatment limitations. 
It appears from the language of the MHPAEA that the new law will be 
able to realize its goals more certainly than did the MHPA.  When reviewing 
the current versions of ERISA, the PHSA, and the IRC in light of the 2008 
Act, it appears more evident than ever that the original law was nothing 
more than a symbolic gesture toward the plight of the mentally ill.  Even 
without considering that insurance providers did in fact use every opportunity 
available to subvert the true purpose of the MHPA, the language of the law 
itself was simply one massive exception.  The prohibitions against annual 
and lifetime benefits limitations themselves begged the question. “But, we 
can continue to discriminate with respect to every other manner of disparate 
financial requirement and treatment limitation, right?” 
While the advent, and subsequent industry domination, of managed 
care admittedly makes it difficult to determine what the true long-term effect 
of the MHPAEA will be in terms of equitability, the legislature appeared to 
take that into consideration.  In addition to barring unequal financial 
requirements and treatment limitations, the new law adds a subsection that 
expressly requires more transparency on the part of insurance providers with 
regard to medical necessity determinations.305  In particular, the amendment 
states “the criteria for medical necessity determinations. . .shall be made 
available. . .to any current or potential participant, beneficiary, or 
 
 302. §§ 512(a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(1). 
 303. MHPAEA, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 512(a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(1) (2008). 
 304. §§ 512(a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(1). 
 305. § 512(a)(1). 
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contracting provider upon request.”306  Moreover, the law requires that the 
reason for any denial of reimbursement or payment for mental health or 
substance use disorder services be made available to a beneficiary upon 
request.307  While this language will obviously not end, or likely even 
dampen, the managed care debate – especially as it pertains to mental 
illness – it shows that the legislature is aware of the potentially negative role 
managed behavioral healthcare could play in the search for truly equitable 
treatment coverage for mental illness. 
It is certain that the MHPAEA is a much better law than its predecessor.  
Not only does it appear that opponents of the legislation have changed their 
tune to some degree; it also seems that proponents in the federal legislature 
planted their feet more firmly and were much less willing to accept 
“compromises” that might seriously damage the potential of the law.308  
Compromises were still made, however, and the law is not as broad as it 
could have been.  In fact, the law is not as broad as the version of H.R. 
1424 that passed on March 5, 2008.  From the time the House passed their 
version of the MHPAEA in March, to the time the President signed the bill 
into law on October 3, changes were made, provisions were deleted, and a 
truly expansive mental health parity law was left for another day. 
B. Can the MHPAEA Achieve its Goals – Could (Should?) More Have Been 
Done? 
In short, time will tell as to whether the MHPAEA is a sufficient attempt at 
true parity in coverage of mental and physical illness, or whether more must 
be done to fully protect the large portion of our society affected by diseases 
of the brain.  Just months after passage of the new law, and months prior to 
its implementation, speculation was the only sure thing, and it began almost 
immediately.309  Much of this speculation was positive and seemed to 
predict that the MHPAEA is a final step toward parity.310  As the previous 
subsection discussed, the 2008 Act is a substantial improvement on the 
MHPA.  However, the law is not as comprehensive as either the Senate bill 
 
 306. § 512(a)(1). 
 307. § 512(a)(1). 
 308. There were still detractors, however.  For an example of the opposition’s arguments 
that persisted, some of which eventually won out, see 154 CONG. REC. H1285 (daily ed. Mar. 
5, 2008) (statements of Reps. Deal, Sullivan, Barton, Broun, McKeon, and Fallin). 
 309. Of course, initial speculation was that the law constituted “a massive triumph.”  It may 
prove to be just that; however, passage of the MHPA created similar initial excitement that 
proved to be short-lived.  See Novotney, supra note 276, at 27 (discussing the “landmark 
victory” for parity advocates). 
 310. See, e.g., Guadagnino, supra note 275 (reporting that the director of advocacy 
programs for the National Alliance of Mental Illness of New Jersey views the law as “a god-
send”). 
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passed in September 2007,311 or the House version of parity passed in 
March 2008.312  More importantly, the law is not as comprehensive as a 
federally enacted benefits parity provision that has been in effect since 
January 1, 2001 – found in the Federal Employee Health Benefits Program 
(“FEHBP”).313 
It is not the purpose of this article to discount the importance of the 
MHPAEA.  But the errors of the past should not be repeated, and 
unquestioned praise should not be heaped upon this law until it has proven 
its merit.  The MHPAEA retains various protective features from the original 
MHPA, which parity advocates argued could permit continued inequities in 
coverage. 
First, the MHPAEA continues the same small employer exemption 
provided for in the MHPA, with essentially a clerical amendment.314  While 
the federal definition of “small employer,” at least in terms of ERISA,315  and 
the PHSA,316 only includes companies with 50 or fewer employees this is 
not, by all definitions, a small company.  In fact, with regard to the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, the federal government has demanded 
compliance from all businesses employing more than fifteen employees.317 
It is not that fifty is necessarily an arbitrary number.318  But knowing that 
parity has been shown not to be cost-prohibitive – likely, rather, cost 
beneficial – why should the law continue to provide a safe haven for 
discrimination?  If the law is going to continue to provide an exemption to 
protect small employers, and the purpose of the law, in fact, is to protect the 
financial viability of these businesses, the law should provide an exemption 
for truly small businesses.  If employers of fifteen or less are the only 
 
 311. S. 558, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 312. H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. (2008).  For example, the House version included a 
provision that would require plans providing mental health or substance use benefits to 
recognize any condition or disorder listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders.  §102(d). 
 313. Howard H. Goldman et al., Behavioral Health Insurance Parity for Federal 
Employees, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1378, 1379 (2006). 
 314. MHPAEA, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §§ 512(a)(3), (b)(3), (c)(3), 122 Stat. 3881-89 
(2008) (amending the small employer definition to include employers with only one employee 
in order to extend the exemption to employers residing in States that permit small employer 
groups to consist of one individual). 
 315. 29 U.S.C. §1185a (c)(1)(B)(2000). 
 316. 42 U.S.C. §300gg-5 (2006). 
 317. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: A PRIMER 
FOR SMALL BUSINESSES 1 (2002). 
 318. According to a 1997 study, only 3-4% of companies with fewer than 50 employees 
were self-insured and thus had insurance plans governed by ERISA.  M. Susan Marquis & 
Stephen H. Long, Recent Trends in Self-Insured Employer Health Plans, HEALTH AFF., May-June 
1999, at 161, 165 ex. 4. 
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businesses allowed to forgo the requirements of the ADA, thus not being 
required to make reasonable accommodations for their disabled employees, 
the law should only extend such a minimal exception to its mental health 
parity provisions.  Moreover, if mental healthcare is not only affordable but 
in fact pays for itself by potentially eliminating many of the substantial 
indirect costs associated with mental illness, it is arguable that no small 
employer exemption is really warranted at all.  Small businesses might balk 
at being required to pay more for healthcare, and generally the argument is 
that they will drop insurance altogether, thus leaving more uninsured.  But if 
these employers, as well as the general public, were sufficiently educated 
about the potential savings based on decreased absenteeism and 
presenteeism resulting from mental illness,319 they might not be so quick to 
limit or remove coverage. 
In addition to continuing the small employer exemption, the MHPAEA 
has provided a new version of an increased cost exemption.320  The MHPA’s 
cost exemption allowed group health plans to forgo the requirements of 
parity if compliance with the law resulted in an increase of one percent in 
the plan cost.321  The MHPAEA has amended this language to provide an 
exemption to plans that see an increase of two percent in the first plan 
year.322  After the first plan year, however, the cost exemption returns to the 
original one percent.323  If coverage of mental illness is affordable, and can 
potentially reduce overall costs, there really should be no argument against 
a cost exemption.  But certain states have reported increases in the overall 
costs of their plans in the first year, followed by a subsequent decline in 
costs.324  Under the federal law, a plan can discontinue mental health 
benefits altogether or can resume inequitable coverage prior to seeing that 
eventual decline.  While only about one percent of health plans dropped 
mental health benefits as a result of enactment of the MHPA,325 that law 
provided so many loopholes for insurance providers so as to make it 
 
 319. See supra Section III (discussing the savings that states have seen after enacting parity 
laws). 
 320. MHPAEA, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §§ 512(a)(3)(B), (b)(3)(B), (c)(3)(B), 122 Stat. 3881-
89 (2008). 
 321. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(c)(2) (2000). 
 322. See, e.g., MHPAEA § 512(a)(3)(B). 
 323. § 512(a)(3)(B). 
 324. See supra notes 183 and 184 and accompanying text (discussing the decline in costs 
that Texas, North Carolina, Ohio, and California saw following the enactment of parity 
legislation). 
 325. See 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 47, at 17. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
392 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 3:343 
unnecessary to remove coverage.  Again, time will tell whether more 
insurers will drop mental health benefits under this law.326 
Like its predecessor, while the MHPAEA technically applies to all mental 
illnesses, it leaves the determination of which mental illnesses will receive 
protection from the Act to plan providers.327  Similarly, which substance use 
disorders will receive protection from the Act will vary, depending on the 
language of individual healthcare plans.328  Although the MHPAEA has 
included a provision requiring health plans to provide criteria for medical 
necessity determinations and reasons for treatment denials to 
beneficiaries,329 the law does not require anything in particular in terms of 
which illnesses and treatments must be provided.  When the House passed 
H.R. 1424 in March 2008, the bill required that if a group health plan 
offered mental health and substance use disorder benefits, it must provide 
coverage for all illnesses listed in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM).330  Many of the 
arguments on the floor of the House against passing the bill concerned this 
mandated coverage provision,331 and the Senate required a concession to 
language mirroring the original law before they would accept the bill.332 
Opponents of the inclusion of all DSM illnesses argue that it will require 
insurance providers to cover many less severe illnesses they might not 
otherwise cover.333  Those supporting inclusion of the DSM say this is simply 
a “red herring”; the medical necessity requirements of insurance plans 
would limit unnecessary treatment coverage.334  By failing to include the 
House language, Congress passed up an opportunity to show that the law 
will not stand for discriminatory treatment of any mental illness.  What may 
 
 326. The American Psychological Association (APA) does not believe this will happen; they 
argue that ninety-seven percent of health plans currently cover mental health and substance 
use benefits and will simply make minor adjustments throughout the plan to offset any 
potential costs.  Am. Psychological Ass’n Practice Org., The Wellstone-Domenici Mental 
Health Parity Act of 2008: Questions and Answers for Psychologists (2008), http://www.apa 
practicecentral.org/news/2008/wellstone-domenici.aspx.  The APA does not address, 
however, the plans that dropped coverage after the 1996 Act, and the potential for more 
dropped coverage in the face of fewer loopholes. 
 327. See, e.g., MHPAEA, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 512(a)(4) (2008). 
 328. MHPAEA § 512(a)(4). 
 329. See, e.g., MHPAEA § 512(a)(1). 
 330. See 154 CONG. REC. H1274, 1279 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 2008). 
 331. See generally id.  Congressmen Deal (GA), Barton (TX), Burgess (TX), and Buyer (IN) 
all cited the DSM as reasons they would vote against the bill.  Id. at H1285-89. 
 332. See Depression and Bipolar Support Alliance, Parity Update (2008), http://www.dbs 
alliance.org/site/PageServer?pagename=advocacy_parity. 
 333. See, e.g., 154 CONG. REC. H1286-89 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 2008) (statement of Rep. 
Deal). 
 334. Id. at H1297 (testimony of Representative Jim Ramstad of Minnesota). 
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be considered a trivial illness to some could be more severe to others.  
Furthermore, the MHPAEA does not only apply to “severe” or “serious” 
mental illnesses.  It applies to all mental illnesses.  It does not, though, 
remove medical necessity determinations from the hands of insurance 
providers.  Therefore, by including the DSM, Congress could have insured 
that no mental illness would be automatically considered “unnecessary”; 
rather, insurance providers would be required to decide medical necessity 
on a case-by-case basis.  The MHPA language won out, and group health 
plans that offer mental health and substance use coverage continue to 
determine which diseases or afflictions constitute mental illness. 
Another major flaw in the MHPA that continued through passage of the 
MHPAEA is the law’s failure to mandate coverage of mental illness and 
substance abuse.335  The language of the MHPA – “[n]othing in this section 
shall be construed as requiring a group health plan. . .to provide any 
mental health benefits” – remains.336  By enacting the MHPAEA, Congress 
garnered praise from the mental health community for finally enacting “full 
parity.”337  What Congress actually enacted, however, is full parity in 
benefits.  While it is difficult to settle on a single definition of “full parity,”338 
generally when one hears the phrase it is meant to describe benefits parity.  
The MHPAEA requires group health plan insurance providers that offer 
mental health benefits to offer them with no additional restrictions to those 
applied to medical and surgical benefits.  Like the MHPA, though, the 2008 
Act does not require any insurance plan to offer mental health benefits.  
That is, it does not mandate benefits.  Some believe this is not an issue.339  
However, Webster’s defines parity as “the quality or condition of being 
equal or equivalent; a like state or degree.”340  It is difficult to argue that 
 
323*- MHPAEA, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §§ 512(a)(4), (b)(4), (c)(4) 122 Stat. 3881-89 (2008). 
 335. Both laws are drafted such that the parity requirements only apply “in the case of a 
group health plan . . . that provides both medical and surgical benefits and mental health 
benefits.”  See 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(a)(1) (2000); see also MHPAEA §512(a)(1).  Of course, 
the new law also applies to substance use disorder benefits, but that provision also only 
applies if the plan offers such benefits. 
 336. 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(b)(1) (2000). 
 337. See Guadagnino, supra note 275 (reporting that, while discussing the impact of the 
MHPAEA on New Jersey, the director of advocacy programs for the National Alliance of 
Mental Illness of New Jersey characterized the law has having “full parity”). 
 338. But see Levinson & Druss, supra note 5, at 143 (stating that “[f]ull parity refers to the 
equalizing of all treatment and dollar limits between medical and mental health care as well 
as the same co-payments and coinsurance rates”). 
 339. See, e.g., Guadagnino, supra note 275 (reporting that the director of advocacy 
programs for the National Alliance of Mental Illness of New Jersey does not believe that it is a 
concern that the federal government will not mandate the offering of mental health coverage). 
 340. Merriam-Webster’s Online, Parity, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/parity 
(last visited Sept. 11, 2010). 
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mental health benefits have the quality or condition of being equal or 
equivalent to medical and surgical benefits if insurance providers are 
permitted to refuse their coverage, even when fully covering more costly and 
less treatable conditions. 
Even a small number of providers refusing to cover mental illnesses or 
substance use disorders will mean that some individuals affected by these 
diseases are not receiving proper treatment and assistance in order to fully 
participate in society.  And again, this does not address the fact that some 
insurance providers completely dropped coverage following implementation 
of the MHPA.341  It can be presumed that this figure will at least be 
duplicated, if not surpassed, upon implementation of the much stricter 
MHPAEA.  No percentage of the mentally ill population should be left to 
fend for itself. 
In order to ensure that all individuals suffering from mental illness are 
protected, the federal law should be amended to reflect the requirements of 
the FEHBP.  Since January 1, 2001, that program has provided coverage 
for mental health and substance abuse on par with coverage for medical 
and surgical benefits.342  On June 7, 1999, in the face of discriminatory 
coverage for federal employees suffering mental illness and acknowledging 
the MHPA’s failure to end discrimination, President Clinton announced 
Executive Order 13,124, mandating parity benefits for federal employees.343  
Not only did the Office of Personnel Management require participating 
FEHBP plans to provide mental health coverage at parity with other benefits, 
it also required the plans to provide coverage for “all diagnostic categories 
of mental health and substance abuse conditions listed in the [DSM].”344  
One aspect of the MHPAEA that goes beyond what the FEHBP requires is 
out-of-network parity.  While the FEHBP required both coverage and parity 
in-network, it did not require parity out-of-network.345  However, in a study 
 
 341. 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 48, at 17. 
 342. See Darrel A. Regier et al., Parity and the Use of Out-of-Network Mental Health 
Benefits in the FEHB Program, HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVE, Dec. 18, 2007, at w70, w72. 
 343. See Exec. Order No. 13,124, 3 C.F.R. 192 (1999), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. §3301 
(2000); see also Remarks at the White House Conference on Mental Health, supra note 118, 
at 894.  President Clinton stated that on that day, the Director of the Office of Personnel 
Management would “inform nearly 300 health plans across America that to participate in our 
program, they must provide equal coverage for mental and physical illnesses.  With this single 
step, 9 million Americans will have health insurance that provides the same copayments for 
mental health conditions as for any other health condition, the same access to specialists, the 
same coverage for medication, the same coverage for outpatient care.”  Id. at 896. 
 344. See Janice R. Lachance, Memorandum for Personnel Directors of Executive 
Departments and Agencies: Mental Health and Substance Abuse Parity Implementation in the 
Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) Program (July 13, 2000), at http://www.opm.gov/ 
insure/health/parity/071300_mental_health.htm. 
 345. Regier et al., supra note 342, at w72-73. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2010] WILL FULL BENEFITS PARITY CREATE REAL PARITY? 395 
of the FEHBP from 2001-2007, it was determined that combined costs did 
not rise in response to managed in-network parity and out-of-network 
nonparity.346  While the FEHBP does not constitute complete parity, as it 
does not require out-of-network parity, it is the closest attempt yet.  After 
seven years, it shows that parity coverage can be mandated and still be 
affordable. 
Advocates are fully aware of the historical discrimination against this 
group.347  They should not settle for overlooking a small percentage of this 
population that will remain uncovered because of the lack of a mandate.  It 
appears that certain health benefit plans simply will not offer coverage for 
mental health benefits, no matter the evidence in support of such coverage, 
without legislation requiring that they cover it.  It seems that the term 
mandate causes some fear.  However, the MHPAEA does not mandate any 
company or group health plan to offer insurance at all.  These businesses 
and providers choose to insure their employees or plan subscribers.  The 
federal law should mandate that they do so in a non-discriminatory manner. 
Other issues remain, including failure of the MHPAEA to apply to 
individual health insurance plans or to Medicare or Medicaid.  However, it 
seems that the law with regard to group health plans alone still has steps to 
overcome.  A cost exemption still permits group health plans to forgo parity 
requirements in the face of minimal cost increases, and the federal law still 
allows “small employers” freely to offer disparate coverage.  Furthermore, 
continuing to allow insurance plans to define mental illness, instead of 
relying on the DSM, opens the door to potential discrimination against 
certain illnesses and treatments that providers determine are too costly or 
not sufficiently effective. 
CONCLUSION 
After decades of discrimination against the mentally ill in this county, 
many might argue the MHPAEA represented the first piece of meaningful 
parity legislation ever passed by the federal government.  Due to fear of 
cost-prohibitive increases in premiums and plan expenses, it took several 
years and many compromises for Congress to enact the MHPA in 1996; 
and while the law was praised, it fell flat when insurance providers used its 
exceptions to continue discrimination.  Furthermore, the law failed in any 
way to protect individuals suffering from substance use disorders, although 
evidence shows that many of these sufferers are so plagued as a result of 
their mental illness.  Almost every state tried its hand at enacting a parity law 
of its own, but federal preemption rules meant that most of these laws would 
 
 346. Id. at w80. 
 347. See supra section I (discussing the historical discrimination against the mentally ill). 
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not reach many targeted insurance plans.  After twelve years of battling the 
less and less credible cost argument, Congress enacted the MHPAEA, 
requiring full parity for mental health benefits when providers offer such 
coverage.  The new law has addressed many of the flaws of the MHPA, and 
hopefully will achieve its goal of providing equitable coverage to the 
millions of individuals who have yet to receive it.  But it fails to mandate 
coverage, and it leaves in place some debatable exemptions from the 
MHPA.  Only time will tell whether the MHPAEA’s failure to address fully the 
flaws of the past will cause continued discrimination against the mentally ill. 
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